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I. INTRODUCTION
Post-conviction practice is an important safeguard against
unjust, unconstitutional, and erroneous convictions. Despite the
importance of the topic, the subject has historically received
scant attention from legal commentators.1  In 1994, "An
Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies, Practice And
Procedure in South Carolina" was published.2 At the time, very
little had been written about the post-conviction remedies
available to prisoners in South Carolina, and the article was
intended to introduce appointed counsel and pro se inmates to
the various post-conviction remedies available.3 In the forty
years since its initial enactment, South Carolina's Post-
Conviction Relief (PCR) Act was amended three times, the South
1. See Vance L. Cowden, Indigent Defense Services for Post-Conviction
Relief in South Carolina: Current Problems and Potential Remedies, 42 S.C. L.
REV. 417, 420 (1990) (describing PCR as "the redheaded stepchild of the legal
system").
2. See John H. Blume, An Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies,
Practice and Procedure in South Carolina, 45 S.C. L. REV. 235 (1994).
3. Id. at 237.
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Carolina Supreme Court issued a number of significant rulings
relevant to post-conviction practice, and there were a number of
federal and state legal developments concerning procedural and
substantive aspects of post-conviction practice. And still, this
topic remains minimally discussed in South Carolina. Thus, our
purpose here is to build upon the initial "Introduction" in the
following three ways: (1) explain the statutory amendments to
South Carolina's PCR Act that have occurred since 1994; (2)
provide an updated discussion of post-conviction practice and
procedure in South Carolina; and (3) provide three appendices:
Appendix A is a comprehensive list of successful PCR cases in
South Carolina under the current statutory scheme (excluding
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claims); Appendix B is
a summary of all successful ineffective assistance of counsel
claims in South Carolina since 1984;4 and Appendix C provides a
set of sample forms, including various applications for post-
conviction relief, sample motions for discovery, and a sample
letter under the Freedom of Information Act.5
Part II of this article provides a brief historical overview of
post-conviction relief in South Carolina, followed by a similarly
brief introduction to South Carolina's current post-conviction
relief process in Part III. Then, Parts IV through VIII explain
South Carolina's post-conviction relief procedure in detail.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IN
SOUTH CAROLINA
The common law writ of habeas corpus was a notion imported
to the colonies from England where it was considered "the most
celebrated writ in English law."6 Habeas corpus was "[r]eceived
into our own law in the colonial period, given explicit recognition
in the Federal Constitution, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, incorporated in the
first grant of federal court jurisdiction, Act of September 24,
1789, c. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81-82, [and] was early confirmed by
4. Apps. A and B were provided by Teresa L. Norris of Blume, Weyble &
Norris LLC.
5. App. C can be accessed at http://www.deathpenaltyresource.org/.
6. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *103; LARRY W. YACKLE,
Postconviction Remedies § 4, at 7 (1981 & Supp. 1993).
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Chief Justice John Marshall to be a 'great constitutional
privilege."'7 The purpose of the writ was
to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever
society deems to be intolerable restraints. Its root principle is
that in a civilized society, government must always be
accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the
imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the
fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to
his immediate release.8
South Carolina became the first American colony to adopt a
statute providing for habeas corpus relief, although in its early
form the remedy was available only in limited circumstances.9 In
the nineteenth century, prisoners in South Carolina could attack
the jurisdiction of the court that had imposed a criminal sentence
but could not otherwise challenge the validity of their convictions
through habeas corpus.10 In the late 1950s and 1960s, the use of
the writ to inquire into the overall legality of a conviction was
expanded in South Carolina after a series of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court related to whether state
procedures for addressing constitutional violations were
adequate to meet the exhaustion requirement for federal habeas
corpus proceedings."l
As early as 1949 in Young v. Ragen, the United States
Supreme Court suggested that the states must provide prisoners
with some form of "clearly defined method by which they may
raise claims of denial of federal rights."12 In stating that
proposition, the Court noted: "[t]he doctrine of exhaustion of
state remedies, to which this Court has required the scrupulous
7. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 (1963) (quoting Ex parte Bollman and
Swartwout, 8 U.S. 75, 95 (1807)).
8. Id. at 401-02.
9. YACKLE, supra note 6; see also Blume, supra note 2, at 238-44
(discussing South Carolina's habeas corpus history in detail).
10. See Ex parte Klugh, 128 S.E. 882, 885 (S.C. 1925) ("[H]abeas Corpus
calls in question only the jurisdiction of the court whose judgment is
challenged.").
11. See, e.g., Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963); Brown v. Allen, 344
U.S. 443 (1953); Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
12. Young, 337 U.S. at 239.
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adherence of all federal courts . . . presupposes that some
adequate state remedy exists."13 At the time of Young, and in the
nearly twenty years that followed, many states employed a wide
variety of common law remedies for dealing with collateral
attacks on criminal convictions-remedies such as habeas corpus,
coram nobis,14 and motions for new trial.15 United States
Supreme Court Justice Clark felt "the great variations in the
scope and availability of such remedies result[ed] in their being
entirely inadequate."16
Shortly after Young, Illinois became the first state to
implement a modern state post-conviction procedure when it
adopted the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act.17 The Act was
designed to consolidate and simplify the various common law
remedies into a single process for testing the validity of criminal
convictions in state court.18 North Carolina followed suit in 1951
with a statute modeled on the Illinois Act.19 Between 1951 and
1963, four other states passed similar legislation2O and six other
13. Id. at 238-39.
14. YACKLE, supra note 6, at 32. The writ of coram nobis was essentially a
post-conviction challenge to the original judgment based upon errors of fact at
trial. Id. It was a precursor to the modern motion for new trial since both seek
the remedy of a new trial. Id. Unlike a motion for new trial, however, coram
nobis was not seen as a continuation of the original case. Rather, like habeas
corpus, coram nobis was viewed as an independent civil action challenging the
criminal conviction. Id. Coram nobis differed from habeas corpus, however, in
that coram nobis was viewed as a collateral attack in which outside evidence
could be brought in, whereas habeas corpus traditionally focused on errors that
occurred on the trial record. Id.
15. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 338 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring); see
also Al-Shabazz v. State, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747-48 (S.C. 2000) ("Before the
adoption of the [Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1969], inmates often
pursued post-appeal claims by petitioning the court for a writ of habeas corpus
or other remedial writ.").
16. Case, 381 U.S. at 338 (Clark, J., concurring).
17. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 122-1.
18. Case, 381 U.S. at 340 (Clark, J., concurring).
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953 & Supp. 1963); Miller v. State,
74 S.E.2d 513, 528 (N.C. 1953).
20. Those states were Maryland, Maine, Oregon, and Wyoming. See MD.
ANN. CODE, art. 27, §§ 645A-654J (1964); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 126, §§ 1-A to
-G (1963); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 138.510-.680 (1963); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-408.1-.7
(1963).
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states adopted similar procedures by rule of court.21
In 1965, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Case v.
Nebraska, "to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the States afford state prisoners some adequate
corrective process for the hearing and determination of claims of
violation of federal constitutional guarantees."22 The Court
ultimately declined to answer this question, however, because
the Nebraska state legislature passed a statute providing for
such review after certiorari was granted.23 In separate
concurring opinions, Justices Clark and Brennan both
encouraged the states to provide modern state post-conviction
procedures to "reduce the necessity for exercise of federal habeas
corpus jurisdiction."24 Justice Brennan advised that these new
state post-conviction procedures "should be swift and simple and
easily invoked."25 Moreover, they should: (a) "be sufficiently
comprehensive to embrace all federal constitutional claims"; (b)
"eschew rigid and technical doctrines of forfeiture, waiver, or
default"; (c) "provide for full fact hearings to resolve disputed
factual issues"; and (d) "provide for decisions supported by
opinions, or fact findings and conclusions of law, which disclose
21. Case, 381 U.S. at 338 n.3 (Clark, J., concurring) (citing ALASKA SuP. CT.
R. 35(b); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 35; FLA. R. CRIM. 1; Ky. R. CRIM. 11.42; Mo.
SUP. CT. R. 27.26; N.J. CRIM PRAc. R. OF SUPER. AND COUNTY CTS. 3:10A-2).
22. Case, 381 U.S. at 337 (Clark, J., concurring).
23. Id. The Court has never affirmatively answered this question. See
Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (denying
stay of execution) ("[T]he scope of the State's obligation to provide collateral
review is shrouded in so much uncertainty .... "). In dicta, the Court has stated
that no such right exists. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557-58
(1987); but see Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 239 (1949) (requiring states to
afford prisoners some "clearly defined method" to raise a claim when federal
rights have been denied). The South Carolina Supreme Court has described the
holding in Case as "[a] determination that the Fourteenth Amendment may
require the states to afford state prisoners some adequate corrective process for
the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional
guarantees." A1-Shabazz v. State, 527 S.E.2d 742, 746 (S.C. 2000) (emphasis
added).
24. Case, 381 U.S. at 346 (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 340 (Clark, J.,
concurring) ("I hope that the various States will follow the lead of Illinois,
Nebraska, Maryland, North Carolina, Maine, Oregon and Wyoming in
providing this modern procedure .... ").
25. Id. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., concurring).
[Volume 4
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 228 2009-2010
Post-Conviction Survival Skills
the grounds of decision and the resolution of disputed facts."26
In the wake of Case v. Nebraska, the Commission on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act.27 Its purpose was "to bring together and consolidate into one
simple statute all the remedies, beyond those that are incident to
the usual procedures of trial and [appellate] review, which are at
present available for challenging the validity of a sentence of
imprisonment."28 South Carolina adopted its version of the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act in 1969 (the PCR Act).29
South Carolina's PCR Act was virtually identical to a revised
version promulgated by the Commission on Unl-orm State
Laws.30 Section 17-27-20(b) states that, in general, the PCR Act
"comprehends and takes the place of all other common law,
statutory or other remedies heretofore available for challenging
the validity of the conviction or sentence."31
In 1995, the South Carolina legislature added a statute of
limitations to the PCR Act.32 One year later, the legislature
passed the South Carolina Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,33
which added statutory language designed to expedite executions
in South Carolina34 and set out rules for the discovery process in
PCR.35 The 1996 amendments also addressed the transfer of files
to post-conviction counsel and provided for a limited statutory
waiver of the attorney-client privilege in PCR cases in which the
applicant alleges ineffective assistance of prior counsel.36
Finally, in 1999, the South Carolina legislature amended the
PCR Statute to provide that the court of appeals may review a
26. Id. at 347.
27. UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, U.L.A. app. H (1966).
28. Id. § 1 Cmt.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -160 (2003).
30. See UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, U.L.A. app. H (1966).
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b) (2003).
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45 (2003). The Act adopting the statute of
limitations became effective on January 12, 1995. See 1995 Act No. 7, Part II,
§ 40. The statute of limitations is discussed in detail infra Part IV.A.i.
33. H.R. 4469, 1995-1996 Leg., 111th Sess. (S.C. 1995-1996), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/sess111_1995-1996/bills/4469.htm.
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-160 (2003).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-150 (2003).
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-130 (2003).
229
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final judgment entered in a PCR proceeding.37
III. OVERVIEW OF MODERN STATE POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF IN SOUTH CAROLINA
A. Nature and Purpose
The purpose of post-conviction relief in South Carolina is to
provide convicted persons with a comprehensive mechanism to
raise any unresolved and previously unmentioned questions of
fact or law relevant to their convictions or sentences. 38 According
to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the PCR Act was
"designed to incorporate all rights available under federal habeas
corpus."39 It was intended to be an exclusive remedy displacing
"all other common law, statutory or other remedies."40 For the
most part, PCR has replaced the various forms of common law
collateral relief, but some exceptions remain.41
An applicant begins a PCR proceeding by submitting a claim
on a standard PCR application.42 The state attorney general's
37. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-100 (2003) ("[A] final judgment entered
under this chapter may be reviewed by a writ of certiorari as provided by the
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.") The 1999 Act No. 55, § 24 added the
court of appeals to the prior language of the rule that stated "[a] final judgment
entered under this chapter may be reviewed by the Supreme Court of this State
on appeal brought either by the applicant or the State in accordance with laws
governing appeals from the circuit court in civil cases." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-
100 (1997). The South Carolina Appellate Court Rules provide that final PCR
decisions shall be reviewed by the supreme court upon petition of either party
for a writ of certiorari, but the supreme court has discretion to transfer any
such case to the court of appeals. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243. (S.C. APP. CT. R. 227 was
renumbered to S.C. APP. CT. R. 243, effective April 29, 2009).
38. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a) (2003); see also YACKLE, supra note 6, at 3
(discussing the purpose of state habeas).
39. Finklea v. State, 255 S.E.2d 447, 447-48 (S.C. 1979); see also Harvey v.
South Carolina, 310 F. Supp. 83, 85 (D.S.C. 1970) ("The [PCR] Act affords all
the protections contemplated by our founding fathers. It is designed to afford
post-conviction relief of a scope sufficiently broad to comply with the mandates
and holdings of the United States Supreme Court relating to federal review of
state convictions.").
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b) (2003).
41. See infra Part VIII.
42. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-40, -50, and -80 (2003); S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1;
S.C. R. Civ. P. FORM 5. A copy of Form 5, current as of Nov. 14, 2009, is
230
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office serves as counsel for the State as respondent. A PCR
action is a civil action generally subject to the rules and statutes
that apply in civil proceedings.43 South Carolina Rule of Civil
Procedure 71.1 instructs the parties to follow the rules of civil
procedure to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the
PCR Act.44 On the other hand, the South Carolina Supreme
Court has recognized that PCR proceedings are unlike other civil
proceedings in that they are "rooted in a criminal case, which
means important constitutional protections and criminal law
concepts are regularly implicated."45 To capture both of these
concepts, PCR is sometimes referred to as a "hybrid form of
action."46
B. Standing
Under the PCR Act, any person who has been convicted of or
sentenced for the commission of a crime may institute a PCR
proceeding.47
The Act does not contain an express "in custody"
requirement. Further, the Act does not expressly require the
applicant to receive a sentence of imprisonment before bringing
a PCR action.
Instead, the Act allows a person who has been convicted of
or sentenced for a crime to file an action. [For purposes of the
PCR Act,] [c]onvict means "to prove a person guilty of a crime."
included in App. C which can be accessed at http://www.deathpenalty
resource.org/. A fill-able version of the form, titled Application for Post-
Conviction Relief, is available on the South Carolina Judicial Department's
website at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/forms/ (last viewed Nov. 14, 2009).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003); Wade v. State, 559 S.E.2d 843, 846-
47 (S.C. 2002).
44. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1.
45. Sutton v. State, 606 S.E.2d 779, 781 (S.C. 2004), overruled on other
grounds by Bray v. State, 620 S.E.2d 743 (S.C. 2005). "PCR cases are treated
differently from traditional civil cases, requiring, for example, that appellate
counsel brief all arguable issues despite counsel's belief the appeal is frivolous
and requiring, by statute, court-appointed counsel for an indigent applicant who
is granted a hearing." Id. (citing Wade, 559 S.E.2d at 847).
46. Sutton, 606 S.E.2d at 781.
47. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a) (2003).
20101 Post-Conviction Survival Skills
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A sentence is defined as "the judgment formally pronounced by
the court or judge upon the defendant after his conviction in a
criminal prosecution, imposing the punishment to be inflicted."
A sentence is not limited to a term of imprisonment; instead, it
may be either a term in prison or a fine or both.4S
Thus, a person has standing to apply for PCR "if he is in
custody or the results of his prior conviction still persist."49 This
is true even if the applicant has never been incarcerated for the
underlying crime.50 For example, in Jackson v. State, Kurtis
Christopher Jackson was convicted of possession of marijuana
and ordered to pay a fine or serve thirty days in jail.51 Jackson
chose to pay the fine and was never incarcerated for the crime.52
In his post-conviction relief application, Jackson alleged his
conviction was invalid and that he continued to suffer a number
of adverse consequences from the conviction, including: (1) he
was denied Section 8 housing;53 (2) the conviction could be used
against him in a custody action; (3) the conviction could be used
to enhance the sentence of a future drug conviction; (4) Jackson's
license was suspended as a result of the conviction without prior
notice; and (5) because he did not know of the suspension,
Jackson was later charged with driving under a suspended
license.54 The South Carolina Supreme Court held that Jackson
was entitled to proceed with his PCR application if the lower
court determined that he was suffering continuing consequences
as a result of his alleged invalid conviction.55 Similarly, a PCR
applicant has standing if the applicant alleges continuing
consequences even though the sentence has already been fully
48. Id. (internal citations omitted).




53. The Section 8 program is a federal housing subsidy program
administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development. 24 C.F.R. § 882 (2001). The purpose of the program is to assist
low income people in obtaining safe and clean rental accommodations and to
promote "economically mixed housing." 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a) (2006); 24 C.F.R.
§ 882.101 (2001).
54. Jackson, 489 S.E.2d at 916 n.1.
55. Id. at 916.
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served.56
C. Post-Conviction v. Direct Appeal
PCR claims must be couched in appropriate procedural
terms-meaning a PCR applicant may not raise claims that were
or could have been raised on direct appeal, nor may a criminal
defendant raise a PCR claim on direct review. A PCR applicant
may not bring a PCR action while a direct appeal is pending.57
"In a direct appeal, the focus is generally upon the propriety of
rulings made by the circuit court in response to a party's motions
or objections."58 In PCR, the focus is usually on alleged errors
made by prior counsel and other errors of law or fact that
occurred outside the record below.59 The South Carolina
Supreme Court said that "when asserting the erroneous
admission of evidence, a violation of a constitutional right, or
other errors in a proceeding, the [PCR] applicant generally must
frame the issue as one of ineffective assistance of counsel."60 This
assertion is both overbroad and underinclusive-not all errors
appropriate for PCR constitute ineffective assistance of counsel,
nor must they be stated as such to be viable PCR claims-but it
is correct that post-conviction relief is not a substitute for direct
appeal.61 In other words, "errors which could have been reviewed
on appeal may not be asserted for the first time, or reasserted in
post-conviction proceedings"2-at least not in exactly the same
way these errors were or could have been asserted on direct
appeal.
Some examples will help clarify this point. South Carolina
ascribes to a set of particularly onerous procedural default
rules.63 In particular, South Carolina requires strict adherence
56. McDuffie v. State, 277 S.E.2d 595, 596 (S.C. 1981).
57. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(b).
58. Al-Shabazz v. State, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (S.C. 2000).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Cummings v. State, 260 S.E.2d 187, 188 (S.C. 1979).
62. Id.
63. See John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, "I Object" is Not Enough: Tips
for Criminal Defense Attorneys on Avoiding Procedural Default, SOUTH
2010]
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to the "contemporaneous objection" rule.64 In State v. Holmes,65 a
capital case, defense counsel objected to the solicitor's closing
argument in which the solicitor took advantage of the trial
judge's erroneous decision to exclude evidence that another man
had actually committed the crime by repeatedly arguing that if
Holmes had not committed the crime, "where is this raping,
murdering, beating fellow that actually did this thing?"66 After
the solicitor had concluded his argument, defense counsel
objected to these statements and moved for a mistrial.67 On
direct appeal, however, the South Carolina Supreme Court held
defense counsel's objection was procedurally barred because,
although defense counsel did bring the issue to the trial court's
attention, he did not do so "contemporaneously" with the
solicitor's statements. 68 Because these claims could have been
reviewed on direct appeal if they had been properly preserved,
Holmes is unable to raise them in the same manner in post-
conviction. Instead, in his PCR application, Holmes must allege
that his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance by
unreasonably failing to preserve the issues for direct review and
that this failure prejudiced the outcome of the case. 69
In another capital case, State v. Stone,70 trial counsel objected
when the victim's widow testified during Stone's second
CAROLINA LAW., Jan. 2009, at 35; John H. Blume & Pamela A. Wilkins, Death
By Default: State Procedural Default Doctrine In Capital Cases, 50 S.C. L. REV.
1 (1998) (discussing South Carolina's procedural default jurisprudence in
detail).
64. See, e.g., State v. Vazquez, 613 S.E.2d 359 (S.C. 2005).
65. 605 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
66. See Transcript of Record on Appeal at 4220, Holmes, 605 S.E.2d 19 (No.
25886). The solicitor made similar arguments throughout his closing
statement. Id. at 4210, 4212, 4216, 4223, 4228, 4231, 4263.
67. Id. at 4236-67.
68. Holmes, 605 S.E.2d at 25.
69. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (holding that to
establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a PCR applicant must
meet a two-prong test by showing: (1) that counsel's performance was deficient
- i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that
counsel's error was prejudicial, meaning that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different).
70. 655 S.E.2d 487 (S.C. 2007).
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sentencing proceeding that she attempted suicide after learning
the South Carolina Supreme Court had reversed Stone's first
death sentence.71 In support of his objection, trial counsel argued
the cause of the suicide attempt was not the victim's murder
seven years earlier, but rather the financial pressures that the
victim's widow and her new husband were experiencing at the
time.72 Counsel also argued that "the fact that she was able to
testify about this attempted suicide was extremely prejudicial to
the defendant and that testimony should have been excluded."73
On appeal, Stone argued the widow's testimony improperly
invited the jury to speculate about the finality of its decision and
to consider how its decision might affect the health of the victim's
widow.74 The South Carolina Supreme Court found this
argument was different from the argument raised at trial, and
thus, it was not preserved for review: "while Appellant's
argument below focused on what caused the victim's widow to
attempt suicide-meaning, what caused the testimony to be
relevant-Appellant's argument on appeal abandons the issue of
relevance and addresses only the effect this testimony may have
had on the jury."75 The court further found that because Stone
"abandoned" the argument he raised at trial, he waived that
argument as well.76
If Stone seeks to raise this issue in PCR based on the
arguments that appellate counsel tried to raise, he will have to
show his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly
preserve the arguments concerning the effect the testimony could
71. Id. at 488.
72. Id.
73. Trial Transcript at 1106, Stone, 655 S.E.2d 487 (No. 26408).
74. Stone, 655 S.E.2d at 488.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 489. The merits of South Carolina's draconian procedural default
rules are thoroughly discussed and critiqued elsewhere. See Blume & Wilkins,
supra note 63 (critiquing South Carolina's modern procedural default rules); see
also Blume & Paavola, supra note 63, at 35-39 (discussing practical concerns
for properly preserving trial objections for appellate review); Robert Dudek, The
Honorable Ralph King Anderson Jr.'s Series on Effective Appellate Practice:
Preserving the Record (2006), http://www.scbar.org/memberresources/con
tinuingiegal-education/distance learning (discussing practical concerns for
properly preserving trial objections for appellate review).
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have had on the jury. Stone's claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective could not have been raised on direct appeal, because it
is not an error that was raised and ruled upon by the trial
court. 77 On the other hand, if Stone seeks to raise the relevance
argument that trial counsel did preserve (on its own or in
addition to the arguments that appellate counsel raised), then his
PCR application must allege appellate counsel was ineffective for
"abandoning" the relevance argument.
D. Cognizable Claims
Claims raised in post-conviction must not only be framed in
appropriate terms, depending on the procedural posture as
explained above, but they must also be otherwise cognizable
under the PCR Act. A PCR applicant can raise almost any
allegation relevant to any phase of the previous court
proceedings. Specifically, an applicant can raise virtually every
alleged denial of a federal constitutional right, with the exception
of sufficiency of the evidence.78 The PCR Act also recognizes
almost any abridgment of a state created right.79 Specifically,
the statute permits the following six categories of claims: (1) the
conviction or sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the
United States, the South Carolina constitution, or South
Carolina state law; (2) the court was without jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; (3) the sentence exceeds the maximum
authorized by law; (4) there is evidence of material facts, not
previously presented and heard, that requires vacation of the
conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; (5) the sentence
has expired; probation, parole or conditional release has been
unlawfully revoked; or that the applicant is otherwise unlawfully
held in custody or other restraint; and (6) the conviction or
77. See State v. Kornahrens, 350 S.E.2d 180, 184 (S.C. 1986) (stating that
a claim of ineffective representation at the trial level is not reviewable on direct
appeal but rather may only be asserted in proceedings under the PCR Act).
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(6) (2003) ("[T]his section shall not be
construed to permit collateral attack on the- ground that the evidence was
insufficient to support a conviction."); but cf. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
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sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any
ground of alleged error previously available under any common
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding or
remedy.80
In 2000, the South Carolina Supreme Court held in Al-
Shabazz v. State,81 that issues related to sentencing credits and
other conditions of imprisonment are not cognizable claims under
the PCR Act.82 Al-Shabazz filed a PCR application challenging
the Department of Corrections Adjustment Committee's decision
to take away a portion of the credits he earned for good conduct.83
He alleged the Committee had unlawfully found him guilty of
violating institutional rules, illegally placed him in solitary
confinement, and violated his constitutional rights when it
withdrew good-time credits from his eighty-three year sentence.8 4
The PCR court summarily dismissed the case,8 5 relying on Tutt v.
State,86 in which the court held the PCR Act does not authorize
an allegation that an inmate's constitutional rights were violated
when prison authorities transferred him within the prison
system and downgraded his custody status.8 7  After Tutt,
however, the court allowed inmates to raise claims regarding
sentence-related credits in PCR proceedings "because calculating
those credits potentially affects the duration of a sentence."88
80. §§ 17-27-20(a)(1)-(6).
81. 527 S.E.2d 742 (S.C. 2000).
82. Id. at 749.
83. Id. at 746.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 290 S.E.2d 414 (S.C. 1982).
87. Id. at 415.
88. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 748; see Busby v. Moore, 498 S.E.2d 883, 884
(S.C. 1998) (deciding in PCR actions that inmates are eligible to earn good-time
credits when their sentence begins to run, but inmates actually earn the credits
only after they behave properly); Harris v. State, 424 S.E.2d 509, 511 (S.C.
1992) (deciding in PCR action that Ex Post Facto Clause was not violated
because inmate was not prejudiced by inability to earn good-time and work
credits); Elmore v. State, 409 S.E.2d 397, 400 (S.C. 1991) (deciding in PCR
action that substantive violation of Ex Post Facto Clause results from denial of
work credits to inmates entitled to such credits when an offense is committed,
but inmate suffered no ex post facto violation because he was not eligible for the
credits when he committed his crime).
237
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Further, despite its decision in Tutt, the court had occasionally
allowed inmates to raise conditions of imprisonment in a PCR
proceeding.89
In 1995, the legislature enacted a statute of limitations for
PCR actions, which requires that an application be filed "within
one year after the entry of a judgment of conviction or within one
year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from
an appeal or the filing of the final decision upon an appeal,
whichever is later."90 The statute also sets a one-year deadline
for filing an application to assert a newly created and
retroactively applied standard or right, and a one-year deadline
to raise newly discovered material facts that require vacation of a
conviction or sentence. 91 Under the new statute of limitations,
"an inmate whose credits-related claim arises years after the
deadline is barred from filing a PCR application."92
Thus, partly to address confusion caused by the courts' cases
over the years and partly to address "the impact of the new
statute of limitations," the court granted certiorari in Al-Shabazz
in order to "re-emphasize the core purpose of the PCR Act as set
forth in S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(a)."93 The court held that, in
general, "PCR is a proper avenue of relief only when the
applicant mounts a collateral attack challenging the validity of
his conviction or sentence."94 The only exceptions to this general
rule are the two non-collateral matters specifically listed in the
PCR Act: (1) the claim that an applicant's sentence has expired;
and (2) the claim that an applicant's probation, parole, or
conditional release has been unlawfully revoked.95 These two
claims do not fit under the court's general approach because they
do not challenge the validity of the underlying conviction or
sentence. Yet, because they are specifically listed in the PCR
89. See Simmons v. State, 446 S.E.2d 436, 437 (S.C. 1994) ("[C]onditions of
imprisonment have been considered on a discretionary basis in PCR
proceedings and by this Court.").
90. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (2003).
91. Id. § 17-27-45(B).
92. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 748-49.
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Act, they may be raised in PCR as non-collateral matters. 96
Aside from these two exceptions, all other PCR claims must
attack the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence.97
The court held that claims regarding sentence-related credits or
other conditions of imprisonment do not fall into this category
and are therefore not cognizable under the PCR Act.98
The court's decision in Al-Shabazz substantially changed the
process by which inmates may raise claims regarding prison
conditions and time credits. Now, inmates must seek review of
these issues in an administrative proceeding under the
,tii-.."trative- roU.. A.t.... Since A. Shabazz, the court
has revisited issues of prison conditions and credits-related
issues several times to clarify that the PCR Act permits a claim
that an inmate has been unlawfully returned to prison,100 and it
permits a claim that a sentence has expired because of actual
time served in another jurisdiction.101 But, the PCR Act does not
permit a claim that the Department of Corrections miscalculated
a sentence's start date due to a clerical error,102 nor does it
recognize a claim that an inmate's parole revocation attorney
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.103
IV. PRE-HEARING PROCEDURE
A. Preparing the Application
i. Statute of Limitations
Under the PCR Act, an applicant must initiate a PCR




99. Id. at 750. This article does not discuss the procedures for this type of
review. The Administrative Procedures Act is set forth in S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-
23-10 to -60 (1976), S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -410 (1976), and S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 1-23-500 to -600 (1976).
100. Kerr v. State, 547 S.E.2d 494, 497 (S.C. 2001).
101. Delahoussaye v. State, 633 S.E.2d 158, 160-61 (S.C. 2006).
102. Cooper v. State, 525 S.E.2d 886, 888 (S.C. 2000).
103. Duckson v. State, 586 S.E.2d 576, 577-78 (S.C. 2003).
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whichever is later: (1) the entry of a judgment of conviction; (2)
the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal;
or (3) the final decision upon an appeal.104 For example, assume
a criminal defendant is convicted of murder, sentenced to death,
and judgment is entered on January 1, 2009. The defendant
appeals to the South Carolina Supreme Court. His appeal is
denied on June 1, 2009; he moves for a rehearing and that
motion is denied on June 10, 2009. Then, the defendant seeks a
writ of certiorari from the-United States Supreme Court. His
petition for certiorari is denied on January 1, 2010. The
defendant must begin a PCR action by January 1, 2011, because
the final disposition upon appeal occurred in his case on January
1, 2010.
If, however, the defendant had opted not to, or was unable to
file a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court,
he should consider the statute of limitations for a PCR action as
running one year from June 10, 2009-treating final disposition
as occurring upon denial of his motion for rehearing before the
South Carolina Supreme Court.105 If the defendant had chosen
not to file an appeal at all, he should commence a PCR action by
January 1, 2010, because entry of the judgment of conviction
occurred on January 1, 2009.
There are two exceptions to the general one-year statute of
limitations. First, when the South Carolina Supreme Court or a
court whose decisions are binding upon the South Carolina
Supreme Court announces a new substantive standard or right
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (2003).
105. This suggestion is based on the most conservative reading of the
statutory language. To our knowledge, there is no South Carolina case law
explaining when a decision upon an appeal becomes "final." For purposes of
federal habeas corpus review, a judgment is not considered "final" until the
conclusion of direct review (including certiorari proceedings) or the expiration of
the time for seeking such review-meaning, where a defendant does not seek
certiorari, for whatever reason, the judgment against him is not considered final
until the time period in which he could have filed a petition for certiorari has
expired. But, because there is no South Carolina authority expressly adopting
this approach for state post-conviction, we prefer to err on the safe side and
recommend that applicants who do not seek certiorari treat their appeals as
"final" upon denial of rehearing (or upon denial of direct appeal if no rehearing
is sought).
[Volume 4CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 240 2009-2010
20101 Post-Conviction Survival Skills
that is intended to be applied retroactively,106 a PCR applicant
has one year from the date on which the new standard or right
was determined to commence a PCR application.107 This rule
applies even if the general statute of limitations has already
expired.108 Thus, in the first example above, assume the
defendant was required to commence a PCR proceeding by
January 1, 2011 but failed to do so. Under normal
circumstances, this defendant's PCR application is untimely
because the statute of limitations has expired. If, however, the
United States Supreme Court announces a new substantive
standard or right that applies to this defendant on June 1, 2011,
and if that new rule is intended to be applied retroactively, the
defendant may nonetheless commence a PCR proceeding as long
as he does so within one year after the Court's decision
announcing the new rule.
Second, if a PCR applicant has newly discovered evidence,
106. South Carolina courts are required to follow the United States
Supreme Court decisions on retroactivity. See, e.g., Danforth v. Minnesota, 522
U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 1029, 1035 (2008); Talley v. State, 640 S.E.2d 878, 880-81
(S.C. 2007). In general, a new procedural rule will not be applied retroactively
unless the new rule falls within one of two exceptions: (1) it "places certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe;" or (2) it "requires the observance of those
procedures that . . . are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal
citation omitted). Examples of decisions falling within the first exception
include Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (excluding mentally retarded
offenders from the death penalty), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
(barring the death penalty for juvenile offenders). The second exception is
''reserved for watershed rules of criminal procedure" which implicate the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the proceeding. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), as an example of the watershed exception. Id. (holding that the Sixth
Amendment right to assistance of counsel for all criminally accused is made
obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment).
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(B) (2003); see also Talley, 640 S.E.2d at 882
(determining that the limitations period set forth in section 17-27-45(B) applied
in Talley's post-conviction relief application because the application was filed
within one year of Alabama v. Sheton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), which announced a
watershed rule of criminal procedure that applies retroactively).
108. See Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 n.7 (S.C. 2003) (citing
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(B)) (an applicant is not barred from raising mental
retardation in a second PCR application).
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she may benefit from a more lenient statute of limitations.
Specifically,
[i]f the applicant contends that there is evidence of
material facts not previously presented and heard that
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence, the application
must be filed under this chapter within one year after the date
of actual discovery of the facts by the applicant or after the
date when the facts could have been ascertained by the
exercise of reasonable diligence. 109
This exception is commonly known as "the discovery rule." In
Coats v. State,110 PCR applicant Roger Coats alleged his trial
attorney was ineffective for improperly advising him that he
would be eligible for parole if he pled guilty to conspiracy to
trafficking marijuana."' Coats ultimately pled guilty, and he
was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.112 Coats did not
pursue a direct appeal.113 After the one-year statute of
limitations had expired, Coats learned he was not eligible for
parole.114 The lower court denied the defendant's PCR
application.15 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Coats's claim fell within the "discovery rule."116 The
court observed that Coats's understanding of "his parole
eligibility may have affected the validity of the underlying
plea."117 Because Coats filed his claim within one year after
discovering his trial attorney's error, his petition was timely and
he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine if his trial
counsel was in fact ineffective.118
Aside from the two statutory exceptions, there may certainly
be situations in which the statute of limitations may be equitably
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(C) (2003).
110. 575 S.E.2d 557 (S.C. 2003).
111. Id. at 558.
112. Id. at 557.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 558.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 559.
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 242 2009-2010
tolled. The South Carolina Supreme Court recently held, as a
matter of first impression, that if an applicant demonstrates his
mental incompetence prevented a timely filing, then tolling of the
PCR limitation period is warranted.119 The court has, however,
held that the statute of limitations is not equitably tolled in other
particular situations: (1) where an applicant is unaware of the
statute of limitations while he is incarcerated in another
jurisdiction;120 (2) while an applicant seeks federal habeas relief
prior to exhausting his state remedies;121 and (3) when a PCR
action is dismissed without prejudice, but the statute of
limitations runs before the applicant refiies.12 2
There is one last caveat to add to this discussion on the
statute of limitations, which is that the general one-year period
does not apply where a defendant is denied direct appeal due to
ineffective assistance of counsel.123 This is not so much an
exception to the statute of limitations, but rather a special
situation in which the statute of limitations does not apply. In
Wilson v. State,124 Wilson was tried and convicted of armed
robbery and sentenced to thirty years confinement in the
department of corrections on October 18, 1995.125 Wilson did not
119. Ferguson v. State, 677 S.E.2d 600 (S.C. 2009).
120. Leamon v. State, 611 S.E.2d 494, 496 (S.C. 2005)
We conclude incarceration in another state does not toll the running of
the statute of limitations. Petitioner had a full year to submit a post-
conviction petition. Ignorance of the statute of limitations is not an
excuse for late filing, even when the Petitioner claims he did not learn
of the statute because he was incarcerated in another state.
Id.
121. Green v. State, 576 S.E.2d 182, 183 (S.C. 2003).
122. Norris v. State, 515 S.E.2d 523, 524-25 (S.C. 1999). "However, a
defendant is estopped from claiming that defense of statute of limitations when
the defendant consents to plaintiffs motion for voluntary dismissal without
prejudice, and the statute has run prior to the granting of the dismissal." Id. at
525 (citing Mende v. Conway Hosp., Inc., 404 S.E.2d 33 (S.C. 1991)). Similarly,
where the State consents to the dismissal of a PCR application after the statute
has run and agrees the petitioner should be allowed to re-file an application, the
State is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to a
subsequent PCR application. Id. at 525.
123. Odom v. State, 523 S.E.2d 753, 756 (S.C. 1999).
124. 559 S.E.2d 581 (S.C. 2002).
125. Id. at 582.
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have direct appeal review.126 Rather, he claimed he instructed
his trial attorney to appeal his conviction, but the trial attorney
failed to do so. 1 27 Nearly two years later, on September 30, 1997,
Wilson filed an application for PCR alleging his trial attorney
was ineffective in several respects. 128 The lower court dismissed
Wilson's petition as untimely.129 On appeal, the South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, holding the statute of limitations does
not apply when an applicant alleges he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to a direct appeal from his criminal
conviction.130 The court explained:
A defendant has the procedural right to one fair bite at the
apple. That is, every defendant has a right to file a direct
appeal and one PCR application. In this case, Wilson has not
had "one bite of the apple" since he has not received either a
direct appeal from his conviction or a PCR hearing.
[The "one fair bite"] policy would be frustrated if the one
year statute of limitations for PCR claims applied where the
applicant was denied his direct appeal due to ineffective
assistance of counsel, and then was denied his right to a PCR
application because of the one year statute of limitations.31
Finally, PCR applicants should be mindful of the statute of
limitations for federal habeas corpus review, which is calculated
by a slightly different standard. Pursuant to the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), as amended in 1996, a
one-year period of limitation applies to an application for "a writ
of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court."132 The limitation period begins to run
from the latest of four possible dates:
(1) the date on which the judgment became final by the





130. Id. at 582-83.
131. Id. (citations omitted).
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2000).
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seeking such review;133
(2) the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(3) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence. 3 4
The one-year federal limitations period is tolled for "the time
during which a properly filed application for [s]tate post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending."135
[T]he entire period of state post-conviction proceedings, from
initial filing to final disposition by the highest state court
(whether a decision on the merits, denial of certiorari, or
expiration of the period of time to seek further appellate
review) is tolled from the limitations period for federal habeas
corpus petitioners. 136
ii. Jurisdiction and Venue
A PCR application must "be heard in, and before any judge
of, a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which the
conviction took place."137 The South Carolina Supreme Court has
133. See supra note 105 (explaining the calculation for this event in greater
detail).
134. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A-D).
135. § 2244(d)(2).
136. See Taylor v. Lee, 186 F.3d 557, 561 (4th Cir. 1999).
137. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-30
(2003) ("The court in which, by the Constitution and statutes of this State,
original jurisdiction in habeas corpus is vested .... ").
2010] Post-Conviction Survival Skills
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held that the phrase "in the county in which the conviction took
place" refers to the judge's jurisdiction in the county and not the
location of the PCR hearing itself.138 Thus, the PCR Act is not
violated, for example, when an applicant's petition is filed in
York County where he was convicted, but the PCR hearing takes
place in Union County by a presiding judge with jurisdiction over
both counties.139 Moreover, although the PCR Act says that "any
judge" of competent jurisdiction may preside over a PCR
proceeding, that is not entirely true. In all post-conviction
proceedings, a judge must recuse himself if he was also the judge
who presided over the guilty plea, criminal trial, or probation
revocation proceeding for which post-conviction relief is being
sought, if the PCR applicant moves for recusal.140 This is a per se
rule of recusal-it is not open to the trial judge's discretion
provided the applicant requests it by motion.141 In capital cases,
the PCR judge must not be the original sentencing judge.142 A
member of the South Carolina Supreme Court (usually the chief
justice) assigns a post-conviction relief judge to maintain
exclusive jurisdiction over the application in capital PCR
proceedings.143
iii. Form and Contents of the Application
A PCR proceeding is commenced by filing a verified
application.144 The application must be filed with the clerk of the
court in which the underlying conviction took place.145 An
applicant must verify facts within her personal knowledge as
well as the authenticity of any documents or exhibits attached to
the application.146 The South Carolina Supreme Court prescribes
a form, designated "Form 5" to the South Carolina Rules of Civil
138. Buchanan v. State, 276 S.E.2d 302, 303-04 (S.C. 1981).
139. Id.
140. Floyd v. State, 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (S.C. 1991).
141. Id.
142. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-160(A) (2003).
143. Id.
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-40 (2003).
145. Id.
146. Id.
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Procedure, on which to make the initial application.147 In
accordance with the PCR Act, the form instructs the applicant to:
(1) identify the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted;
(2) give the date of the entry of the judgment and sentence
complained of; (3) specifically set forth the grounds upon which
the application is based, and clearly state the relief desired; and,
(4) identify all previous proceedings taken by the applicant to
secure relief from his conviction or sentence, and identify the
grounds asserted in all previous proceedings.148 Form 5 also
instructs applicants to "state concisely . . . the facts which
support each of the grounds" on which the applicant bases her
allegations for relief.149 Arguments, citations and discussion of
legal authorities, however, are not necessary. 150
iv. Fees
The PCR Act specifically states an action for post-conviction
relief may be instituted without the payment of a filing fee,151
regardless of the applicant's financial status. 52 Other types of
civil inmate litigation do require payment of a filing fee through
quarterly deductions from the inmates' department of corrections
trust accounts. 53 In such instances, the prisoner must file a
certified copy of his trust account with the court showing the
account balance.154 In the case of PCR, however, there is no
filing fee required by law, and the more general rules concerning
civil inmate litigation do not apply.155 Moreover, an indigent
147. S.C. R. Civ. P. FORM 5. A copy of this form, current as of Nov. 14, 2009,
is included in App. C which can be accessed at http://www.deathpenaltyresource
.org/. A fill-able version of the form, titled Application for Post-Conviction
Relief, is available on the South Carolina Judicial Department's website at
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/forms/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2009).
148. Id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-50 (2003).
149. S.C. R. Civ. P. FORM 5.
150. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-50 (2003).
151. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(6) (2003).
152. Thompson v. State, 479 S.E.2d 808, 808 (S.C. 1997).
153. H.B. 4472, 1996 Leg., Act 455 § 1 (S.C. 1996) (codified as amended at
S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-27-100 (2003)).
154. Id.
155. Thompson, 479 S.E.2d at 808.
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PCR applicant is entitled to a free copy of his trial transcript
upon a showing of need.156 In practical terms, a PCR applicant or
his post-conviction counsel can usually obtain a copy of the trial
transcript from appellate counsel, assuming the applicant has
had appellate review.
B. Procedure upon Court's Receipt of Application
i. The State's response
Upon receipt of the application, the court clerk will docket
the application, bring it to the attention of the court, and deliver
copies to the attorney general and the solicitor of the circuit in
which the applicant was convicted.157 The State, as respondent,
is required to answer the allegations within thirty days, or
within such time as the court may allow.158 However, if the State
fails to respond within the specified period, the applicant must
conclusively show he was prejudiced by the State's delay in order
to receive the relief requested in the application.159 The State
may respond by answer (usually called a "return") or by motion
which may be supported by affidavits.160 If the State responds by
motion, it will generally be construed as either: (1) a motion to
dismiss (in which the State claims that the application should be
dismissed because it is successive, barred by the statute of
limitations, otherwise improperly filed, or fails to allege facts
that, assuming they are true, are sufficient to constitute a legal
cause of action);161 or, (2) a motion for summary judgment (in
which the State alleges there is no genuine issue of material fact
156. Gunter v. State, 229 S.E.2d 723, 724 (S.C. 1976).
157. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-40 (2003).
158. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(a) (2003).
159. Kneece v. State, 236 S.E.2d 746, 747 (S.C. 1977) (per curiam) (citing
Herring v. State, 206 S.E.2d 885 (S.C. 1974) (per curiam)); see also Slezak v.
South Carolina, No. 2003-CP-10-766, 2003 WL 25459562, at *8 (S.C. Com. P1.
Nov. 24, 2003) (citing Kneece with approval).
160. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(a) (2003).
161. S.C. R. CIV. P. 12(b). In considering the PCR application, however, the
court must "take account of substance, regardless of defects of form." S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-27-70(a) (2003).
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and the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law).162 It is
not uncommon for the State to file a return to the application and
simultaneously file a motion for summary judgment.
ii. Determining Whether a Hearing is Required and
Appointment of Counsel
In capital cases, if the applicant is indigent and desires to be
represented by counsel, the court must appoint two attorneys to
represent the applicant.163 In non-capital cases, counsel will be
appointed for indigent applicants only if a hearing is held.164 If
the inmate cannot afford to hire an attorney to prepare the
application, as nearly all cannot, she must prepare the
application herself. Under the PCR Act, counsel will not be
appointed to represent an indigent inmate until after the
application has been filed. Even then, counsel will not be
appointed unless the application properly alleges one or more
grounds that will require a hearing.165 Historically, it has been
up to the PCR judge to review the application, determine
whether or not it alleged sufficient grounds to require a hearing,
and then grant or deny appointment of counsel accordingly. This
process was inadequate to protect an inmate's right to
meaningful post-conviction review, because the hinge on which
the court's decision turned-the application-is left entirely to
the inmate alone.
Recently, however, the chief justice of the South Carolina
Supreme Court issued an administrative order in which she
opined that even this procedure resulted in too many
appointments of counsel in PCR cases. 166 On October 6, 2008,
162. S.C. R. CIV. P. 56. If a party moves to dismiss, but presents matters
outside the pleadings (and those matters are not excluded by the court) the
motion will be treated as one for summary judgment rather than a motion to
dismiss. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
163. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-160(B) (2003).
164. S.C. R. CIv. P. 71.1(d) ("If, after the State has filed its return, the
application presents questions of law or fact which will require a hearing, the
court shall promptly appoint counsel to assist the applicant if he is indigent.").
165. Id.
166. See Order Appointment of Counsel in Post-Conviction Relief Cases
Before the Circuit Court, (Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Order Appointment], http:
20101
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Chief Justice Toal directed that instead of the PCR judge, the
attorney general's office-the respondent-will now decide
whether or not a PCR applicant is entitled to counsel. Under the
new procedure, the attorney general's office files a return to the
inmate's application in which "the [a]ttorney [g]eneral's [o]ffice
shall clearly state in the caption heading whether it requests
that counsel be appointed for the applicant."167 If the attorney
general, who is the inmate's adversary, requests that counsel not
be appointed and asserts that the application is barred as being
successive or as being untimely under the statute of limitations,
only the chief judge for administrative purposes in that circuit
may override the request by written order.168 If the attorney
general does not recommend the appointment of counsel for any
other reason, counsel will not be appointed without a written
order of a circuit court judge.169 Without counsel, however, it is
unclear how any prisoner is expected to obtain a written order
overriding the attorney general's request, and no procedure for
obtaining such review is set forth in Chief Justice Toal's
directive.
Although the impetus for Chief Justice Toal's administrative
order-the conservation of judicial resources-is a valid concern,
the solution tramples the rights of inmates and exacerbates an
already ineffective mechanism for the appointment of counsel in
PCR cases.1 70 The new procedure creates an inherent conflict of
interest by placing power over the appointment of counsel in the
hands of the attorney general-whose role as an advocate for the





170. It is far from clear whether Chief Justice Toal, or any other justice, has
the authority to issue such an order. It is unclear whether a single justice of the
court may delegate what is essentially a judicial function by reassigning that
function to the executive branch, of which the state attorney general is a
member. Moreover, although the court as a whole has authority to make
certain kinds of rules, such as rules of procedure, all court members as well as
the public generally participate in that process. It is far more questionable for a
single member of the court to issue a broad-sweeping rule without any prior
notice or participation by the public.
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hands of a neutral arbitrator. Moreover, the very nature of the
order, which was designed to prevent "an unnecessary burden"171
on appointed counsel and courts, biases an already-biased
decision-maker against the appointment of counsel. Without
counsel, many applicants cannot possibly know whether their
claims have merit, whether they have a claim requiring a
hearing, or whether the attorney general's recommendation as to
counsel is properly grounded in fact and law. Denying counsel to
assist applicants with this process and assigning that task to
their adversary instead is hardly a good solution. A better
mh f PCr cases woul be to provide i-housemetnoa or screening ,T JU  .... 1
lawyers in prisons to help potential applicants wade through
their claims and prepare their applications. These lawyers could
help reduce frivolous PCR applications by helping inmates
discern between meritorious claims and those that are time-
barred, successive, or otherwise without merit.
iii. Discovery
Except in capital cases in which the applicant is
automatically entitled to discovery, PCR applicants are only
allowed to invoke the processes of discovery if, and to the extent
that, a judge grants them leave to do so.172 The court has
discretion to permit discovery for good cause shown but is not
required to grant discovery in any non-capital case.173  An
applicant desiring to engage in formal discovery should file a
motion for leave to obtain discovery, explaining why she has good
cause to invoke discovery. The motion should indicate what
discovery is requested and why it is needed.174 A non-capital
PCR applicant is not assigned a PCR judge until her case is
scheduled for hearing by the attorney general assigned to the
case. In order to obtain a ruling on the discovery motion in
advance of the hearing, it is recommended that non-capital
applicants employ one of two methods: (1) file the motion for
171. See Order Appointment, supra note 166,
172. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-150 (2003).
173. Id.
174. A sample motion requesting discovery is included in App. C which can
be accessed at http://www.deathpenaltyresource.org/.
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leave to obtain discovery before the chief administrative common
pleas judge in the circuit in which the conviction occurred and
request a hearing on the motion from that judge; or (2) file the
motion in the appropriate circuit and then request that the
motion be scheduled for hearing at the next upcoming PCR
term-by either contacting the attorney general assigned to that
term, or if necessary, by making the request to the judge
assigned to the next PCR term.
Once authorized, the rules of discovery applicable in other
civil cases also apply in PCR proceedings.175 The rules allow for
use of interrogatories, requests to produce documents, requests
for admission, and other discovery mechanisms. The PCR Act
provides for the appointment of counsel to indigent defendants
"[ijf necessary for the effective utilization of discovery
procedures."176
Even in cases in which the court refuses to grant discovery,
applicants may obtain some of the information they need through
state and federal Freedom of Information Act laws (FOIA). The
South Carolina Freedom of Information Act is codified at sections
30-4-10 to -165 in the South Carolina Code.177 Upon request,
FOIA mandates disclosure of records held by a "public body"
unless the documents fall within enumerated exemptions.178
"South Carolina's FOIA was designed to guarantee the public
reasonable access to certain activities of the government."179 In
enacting FOIA, the South Carolina legislature expressly provided
that disclosure is the dominant objective of the act:
The General Assembly finds that it is vital in a democratic
society that public business be performed in an open and public
manner so that citizens shall be advised of the performance of
public officials and of the decisions that are reached in public
activity and in the formulation of public policy. Toward this
end, provisions of this chapter must be construed so as to make
it possible for citizens, or their representatives, to learn and
175. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-150(B) (2003).
176. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-150(A) (2003).
177. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -165 (2003).
178. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-30 to -40 (2003).
179. Fowler v. Beasley, 472 S.E.2d 630, 633 (S.C. 1996).
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report fully the activities of their public officials at a minimum
cost or delay to the persons seeking access to public documents
or meetings.18 0
Thus, FOIA creates an affirmative duty on the part of public
bodies to disclose information to any member of the public who
requests it. 181
The key operative provision of FOIA provides: "Any person
has a right to inspect or copy any public record of a public body,
except as otherwise provided by § 30-4-40, in accordance with
reasonable rules concerning time and place of access."182 A
"public body" includes, among other things, any department of
the state, any state board, commission, agency, or authority, any
public or government body, political subdivision of the state, or
any organization, corporation or agency supported in whole or in
part by public funds or expending public funds.183 A "public
record" is defined broadly to include "all books, papers, maps,
photographs, cards, tapes, recordings, or other documentary
materials regardless of physical form or characteristics prepared,
owned, used, in the possession of, or retained by a public body."184
Thus, in general, PCR applicants may use FOIA to request public
records from a number of public bodies, including the police, the
State Law Enforcement Division (SLED), the solicitor's office, the
Department of Juvenile Justice, and the South Carolina
Department of Corrections.185
There are a number of exceptions to FOIAs general rule of
disclosure. For example, the definition of "public record"
excludes certain types of personal documents, such as personal
income tax returns, medical records, and documents containing
details regarding the users of public and private libraries.186
180. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-15 (2003).
181. Bellamy v. Brown, 408 S.E.2d 219, 221 (S.C. 1991).
182. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(a) (2003).
183. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (2003).
184. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(c) (2003).
185. See § 30-4-20(a); see also Burton v. York County Sheriffs Dep't, 594
S.E.2d 888, 893 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004) ("The Sherriffs Department, therefore,
clearly falls within the compass of the plain meaning of 'public or governmental
body or political subdivision of the State' under section 30-4-20(a).").
186. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(c) (2003).
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Further, § 30-4-40 exempts a variety of matters from
disclosure.187 In particular for our purposes here, § 30-4-40(a)(3)
provides an exception for records of law enforcement agencies
that were compiled during the process of investigating a crime if
the disclosure would harm the agency by: (A) disclosing the
identity of informants not otherwise known; (B) prematurely
releasing information to be used in a prospective law
enforcement action; (C) disclosing investigatory techniques not
otherwise known outside the government; (D) endangering the
life, health, or property of any person; or (E) disclosing any
contents of intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communications
not otherwise disclosed during trial.188 Consistent with FOIAs
goal of broad disclosure, however, "the exemptions from its
mandates are to be narrowly construed."189 For example, many of
the above exceptions do not apply in cases in which the
investigation has closed, a trial has already occurred, or both.190
In any event, the public body bears the burden of asserting and
proving that an exemption applies.91 For a PCR applicant, the
first step is simply to submit a written request for the desired
documents.
Finally, FOIA allows the public body to reduce or waive
search and copying fees when release of the requested
information would be "in the public interest."92 Indigent
applicants, especially, may have success with requests that
public bodies waive the applicable fees. At a minimum, FOIA
mandates that "[t]he records must be furnished at the lowest
possible cost to the person requesting the records."193
For federal agencies, the federal Freedom of Information
187. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40 (2003).
188. § 30-4-40(a)(3).
189. Burton, 594 S.E.2d at 893.
190. See, e.g., Evening Post Publ'g Co. v. City of N. Charleston, 611 S.E.2d
496, 499 (S.C. 2005) ("[Freedom of Information Act] exemption is intended to
prevent harms such as those caused by release of a crime suspect's name before
arrest, the location of an upcoming sting operation, and other sensitive law-
enforcement information.").
191. Id. at 499.
192. S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(b) (2003).
193. Id.
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Act 194 includes similar provisions as the South Carolina FOIA. It
is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552.195
iv. Funds for Investigative and Expert Services
The PCR Act provides that indigent applicants shall receive
funding for court costs and expenses of representation "in
amounts and to the extent funds are made available to indigent
defendants" at trial.196 The South Carolina General Assembly
has allotted five hundred dollars for investigative and expert
services; however, the court may award additional funds upon a
showing that the services are reasonable and necessary. 197 An
applicant in need of additional funds generally files a motion
asking the court to award the funds and explaining why the
services are needed.
In capital cases, the PCR Act clearly provides that the court
shall determine the payment of funds for investigative and
expert services in an ex parte proceeding.198 In a handful of
recent capital PCR cases, however, the State has argued that the
ex parte nature of requests for funding applies only in criminal
trials and not in capital post-conviction proceedings.99 The State
194. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
195. The Freedom of Information Act Service Center provides an online
guide to using the federal Freedom of Information Act. Federal Open
Government Guide, (Corina J. Zarek ed., The Reporters Committee for Freedom
of the Press, 10th ed. 2009), http://www.rcfp.org/fogg/index.php?i=ptl (last
visited November 21, 2009).
196. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-60 (2003).
197. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50(B), (C) (2003).
198. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-160(B) (2003) (requiring payment in the
same manner and rate as provided for appointed trial counsel in S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-26 (2003), which requires ex parte proceedings for the court's
determination of funding issues).
199. See Return to Motion to Permit Applicant to Seek Funding By Ex Parte
Proceedings, Simmons v. Maynard, C/A No. 2003-CP-18-1192 (Ct. Com. P1. Aug.
10, 2005); Motion to Prohibit Ex Parte Communication, Stone v. South
Carolina, C/A No. 2008-CP-43-00905 (Ct. Com. P1. Apr. 18, 2008). See also
Letter from Donald J. Zelenka, Assistant Deputy Attorney General, State of
South Carolina, to The Honorable Wyatt T. Saunders, Circuit Court Judge,
South Carolina Circuit Court, Eighth Circuit (Apr. 11, 2002) (responding to
applicant's motion to conduct all proceedings ex parte in Hughey v. Maynard,
C/A No. 00-CP-01-0212) (on file with author).
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bases this argument entirely on a footnote in Thames v.
State2OO-a non-capital case in which the ex parte nature of
funding requests was not at issue and which was decided before
the enactment of the current controlling statutory provision.201
To our knowledge, the State has never succeeded in its efforts to
participate in proceedings for the determination of funding in
capital PCR proceedings.202
Although Thames's application has not been challenged in
non-capital PCR cases, there are several grounds upon which
such a challenge could (and should) be based. As explained
above, the language contained in footnote 1 of Thames is dicta-
the ex parte nature of funding requests was never at issue in that
case. Moreover, denial of ex parte proceedings for indigent
defendants who request funding for expert and investigative
services in any PCR action could infringe upon the applicant's
constitutional rights. Allowing the State to participate in the
200. 478 S.E.2d 682 (S.C. 1996) (per curiam).
201. In Thames, the PCR applicant did not seek ex parte review of her
request for expert services. Id. at 682 n.1. Neither Thames nor the State raised
the ex parte issue on appeal. Id. Accordingly, a non-capital PCR applicant's
right to ex parte application for funding has never been considered by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in a contested, adversarial proceeding. Second,
Thames dealt with non-capital proceedings. Funding for non-capital PCR
proceedings are controlled by S.C. CODE ANN. sections 17-27-60 and 17-3-50
(2003). Funding for capital PCR proceedings, however, are controlled by an
entirely different statutory provision-S.C. CODE ANN. section 17-27-160 (2003)-
which was not discussed in Thames and, indeed, could not have been since
Thames was decided before the legislature enacted that provision.
202. See Order Granting Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Requests to
Conduct All Proceedings with Respect to Applicant's Requests for Expert,
Investigative or Other Services Ex Parte, Hughey v. Maynard, C/A No. 00-CP-
01-212 (Ct. Com. P1. Dec. 18, 2002); Applicant's Motion to Permit Applicant to
Seek Funding by Ex Parte Proceedings, Simmons v. Maynard, C/A No. 2005-
CP-18-1368 (Ct. Com. P1. Feb. 3, 2006). One court has ordered the parties to
comply with a hybrid procedure set forth in State v. Row, 955 P.2d 1082 (Idaho
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 415 (1998), under which the applicant moves for
funds under seal to the court while merely notifying opposing counsel that such
request has been submitted. See Order, Simmons v. Maynard, C/A No. 2005-
CP-18-1368. Under Row, the "applicant, however, is not required to disclose to
opposing counsel the nature or contents of his submission to the court." Id.
(emphasis added). After reviewing the request for funds, the court enters an
order under seal. Opposing counsel receives notice that the court entered an
order with respect to funding, "but [riespondents shall receive no further
information." Id. (emphasis added).
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funding request could violate the Due Process Clause by
providing the State with strategic information it would not
otherwise be entitled to, such as which experts the applicant may
desire to consult but not call as a witness at the PCR hearing.
This result would be particularly unfair given that the State is
not similarly required to make these types of disclosures to PCR
applicants. Moreover, indigent applicants would have to reveal
this information to the State only because they are indigent, in
violation of equal protection. "[F]undamental fairness entitles
indigent defendants to an 'adequate opportunity to present their
claims fairly within the adversary system."'203 This promise of
"an adequate opportunity"204 vanishes if the State, with its nearly
unlimited resources to investigate a PCR applicant's case at all
phases of litigation,205 has access to privileged information only
because of an applicant's indigent status. As the South Carolina
Supreme Court has explained:
Any time criminal procedures discriminate against defendants
by reason of their indigent status, such procedures violate the
guarantee of equal protection. Where the indigent defendant is
subjected to a process which is required of an indigent
defendant and not of a non-indigent defendant, then the
process becomes invidiously discriminatory and violative of
equal protection. 206
C. Summary Disposition
Either party may move for summary judgment on the PCR
application at any time. The PCR court may grant such a motion
"when it appears from the pleadings, depositions and admissions
and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted,
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving
203. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985) (internal quotations omitted).
204. Id.
205. See Bailey v. State, 424 S.E.2d 503, 506 (S.C. 1992) (contrasting the
resource constraints faced by defense counsel with those of the "publicly
compensated solicitor, who has at his disposal the entire array of state, county,
and municipal law enforcement," as well as access to "dramatic technological
advances" and other experts).
206. Exparte Lexington County, 442 S.E.2d 589, 594 (S.C. 1994).
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party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."207 Moreover,
the PCR court may sua sponte indicate its intention to dismiss
the application because there is no material issue of fact.208 If, at
any time, the court is satisfied "on the basis of the application,
the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant is not
entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served
by any further proceedings, [the court] may indicate to the
parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for
so doing."209 The applicant must be given an opportunity to
respond to the proposed dismissal.210 In light of the applicant's
response, or lack thereof, "the court may order the application
dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or direct
that the proceedings otherwise continue."211
D. Expedited Procedures for Capital Cases
In 1996, the legislature amended the PCR Act by, among
other things, adopting section 17-27-160, designed to expedite
procedures in capital PCR cases.212 This section requires that
two qualified213 counsel be "immediately"24 appointed for





212. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-160 (2003).
213. To be considered qualified, the statute provides that counsel must
"meet the minimum qualifications set forth in section 16-3-26(B) and section 16-
3-26(F)" and "have successfully completed, within the previous two years, not
less than twelve hours of South Carolina Bar approved continuing legal
education or professional training primarily involving advocacy in the field of
capital appellate and/or post-conviction defense." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-
160(B) (2003). However, on August 15, 2003, Chief Justice Toal issued a
memorandum to all circuit court judges informing them that "[i]t is my opinion
that the second clause: or professional training primarily involving advocacy in
the field of capital appellate and/or post-conviction defense does not modify the
first clause but is a separate way to become qualified under the rule." See
Memorandum from Jean H. Toal, Chief Justice, The Supreme Court of South
Carolina on Appointment of Counsel in Capital Post-Conviction Relief Matters
to all Circuit Court Judges (Aug. 13, 2003) (on file with author), available at
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/whatsnew/displaywhatsnew.cfm?indexlD=165.
Thus, in effect, no specialized training in capital defense is required to be
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indigent PCR applicants who have been sentenced to death.215
The State's return is due within thirty days upon receipt of the
PCR application.216 Within thirty days after the filing of the
State's return, the PCR Act provides that "the judge shall
convene a status conference to schedule a hearing on the
merits."2l7After the hearing, the PCR judge must issue specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law within thirty days from
receipt of the transcript or receipt of any post-trial briefs,
whichever is later.218 Court reporters are required to give
priority to capital PCR proceedings.219
E. Obtaining a Stay of Execution Pending PCR in Capital Cases
If the PCR applicant is a death-sentenced inmate, he must
take additional steps to ensure that his execution date is stayed,
allowing him to pursue state post-conviction relief. If a
defendant's death sentence is upheld by the South Carolina
Supreme Court on direct review, the clerk of the court will
automatically issue an execution notice instructing the South
Carolina Department of Corrections to carry out the execution on
the fourth Friday following receipt of the notice by the
appropriate prison officials.220 The mere filing of a PCR
application does not itself work to stay the execution date. "If the
defendant desires a stay to pursue state post-conviction relief,"
he must file a motion to stay with the South Carolina Supreme
Court within ten days of the date on which the execution notice
was issued.221 The motion must set forth "the issues intended to
qualified as counsel in a capital PCR proceeding.
214. Although the statute requires the immediate appointment of two
qualified counsel, that is not what occurs in practice. In fact, counsel are not
appointed in capital PCR cases until after the death-sentenced inmate has
requested and obtained a stay of his execution date. See subsection E for more
detail on obtaining a stay.





220. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-370 (2003).
221. In re Stays of Execution in Capital Cases, 471 S.E.2d 140, 141 (S.C.
2010]
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be raised in the application for post-conviction relief."222 Upon
receipt of the motion to stay, the court will assign a circuit court
judge to the PCR case and issue a stay of execution.223 Within
thirty days of the date of the stay order, the PCR judge must
make an appointment of counsel if the defendant is indigent and
desires to be represented by counsel.224
V. PLEADING CONSIDERATIONS
A. Considerations on the Scope of Pleading
South Carolina law is somewhat unclear on the exact scope of
pleading required in PCR applications. In general, post-
conviction is considered a civil proceeding, and the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure generally require "notice
pleading" rather than "fact pleading" in civil actions.225 In other
words, South Carolina's civil rules "merely require that the
pleadings give notice of the claim being made against the
adversary and of the grounds upon which it rests, rather than
allege in detail the specific facts upon which the claim is
based."226 The purpose of notice pleading "is simply to give fair
notice to the opposing party"227 of the legal claims, but the
"[r]esolution of facts which sustain a pleading is left to
discovery."228 The PCR Act and Form 5 are consistent with the
notice pleading regime in that they require the applicant to





225. See Austin v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 606 S.E.2d 209, 214 (S.C. Ct. App.
2004) (acknowledging that South Carolina's Rules of Civil Procedure ascribe to
"the lenient notice pleading regime"); see also S.C. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (requiring that
pleadings contain "a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief"); S.C. R. CIv. P. 8(b) (requiring that defenses be
asserted by stating "in short and plain terms the facts constituting ... defenses
to each cause of action asserted").
226. 61A AM. JUR. 2d Pleading § 5 (1999) (internal citations omitted)
(explaining the difference between fact and notice pleading).
227. Campbell v. Ethex Corp., 413 F. Supp. 2d 738, 740 (W.D. Va. 2006).
228. Studelska v. Avercamp, 504 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
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application is based and give a "concise" statement of the facts to
support each ground.229 In theory, therefore, notice pleading is
all that is required to initiate PCR proceedings,230 but there are a
few qualifications to this point.
First, as explained above,231 formal discovery is not
guaranteed except in capital cases. Thus, the general civil notion
that one can always start by giving basic notice of his claims and
then support them with detailed facts after discovery will not
apply in every PCR case.
Second, in capital as well as non-capital cases, it is not
uncommon for the State to move for dismissal or summary
judgment simultaneously upon making a Return to the
Application. The application should be prepared with an eye
toward surviving both of these challenges.
Finally, counsel and pro se applicants should be aware that
the PCR Act provides that allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel will result in an automatic wavier of the attorney-client
privilege "to the extent necessary for prior counsel to respond to
the allegation."232 Trial or appellate counsel "alleged to have
been ineffective is free to discuss and disclose any aspect of the
representation with representatives of the State for purposes of
defending against the allegations of ineffectiveness."233 Recently,
the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari in State v.
Binney234 to determine a question concerning the scope of this
waiver.235 Jonathan Binney is a death-sentenced inmate.236
After exhausting his remedies on direct appeal, Binney filed a
229. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-50 (2003); S.C. R. CIv. P. FORM 5.
230. The PCR Act itself does not specifically say otherwise. Moreover, S.C.
R. Civ. P. 71.1(a) provides that the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure
apply in PCR cases to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the Act,
and there is no dispute that the civil rules generally require only notice
pleading.
231. See supra Part IV.B.iii.
232. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-130 (2003).
233. Id.
234. 608 S.E.2d 418 (S.C. 2005), cert. granted (Aug. 22, 2008) (on file with
author).
235. The authors are serving as counsel for Mr. Binney in his PCR
proceedings and before the supreme court.
236. Binney, 608 S.E.2d 418.
2010]
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PCR application in which he alleged various reasons. 237 In
237. In particular, Binney's allegations of trial counsel's ineffectiveness
were:
10(a): Applicant was denied the right to effective assistance of
counsel-guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and by Article I, §§ 3 and 14 of the South
Carolina Constitution-during the guilt-or-innocence phase of his
capital trial.
11(a): Supporting facts: Trial counsel's performance during the
guilt-or-innocence phase was both unreasonable and prejudicial. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Counsel's acts or
omissions included, but are not limited to, the following:
1) Counsel failed to ensure that jurors were not aware that
applicant was shackled during proceedings.
2) Counsel failed to seek an instruction stating that a
burglary charge must set forth one, specific crime intended upon
entry and stating what the specific crime was in this case.
3) Counsel failed to seek an instruction stating the specific
elements of the crime named in the burglary charge.
4) Counsel failed to adequately investigate the facts and
circumstances surrounding the death of the victim. Counsel's
failure to conduct such an investigation deprived the jury of
critical information relevant to an accurate assessment of
applicant's guilt or innocence. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S.
510 (2003).
10(b): Applicant was denied the right to effective assistance of
counsel-guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and by Article I, §§ 3 and 14 of the South
Carolina Constitution-during the sentencing phase of his capital
trial.
11(b): Supporting facts: Trial counsel's performance during the
sentencing phase was both unreasonable and prejudicial. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Counsel's acts or
omissions included, but are not limited to, the following:
1) Counsel failed to investigate, develop, and present all
available, relevant, and admissible mitigating evidence. See
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003). As a result of counsel's
failure to uncover and present this evidence, applicant's death
sentence is unreliable.
2) Counsel failed to object on all possible grounds to
inflammatory and irrelevant evidence presented by the
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response to these allegations, one of Binney's trial attorneys
provided a copy of his entire trial file to representatives from the
attorney general's office who were representing the State in
Binney's PCR proceeding.238 Binney argued that he did not
waive his attorney-client privilege with respect to the entire file
because much of the material contained in the file was not
''necessary" to respond to any claim of ineffective assistance
alleged in his PCR application.239 The PCR court, however, ruled
that Binney's allegations of ineffectiveness were stated in broad
and general terms and thus the entire trial file was responsive to
the application.240 In other words, the lower court ruled that the
PCR Act permits a complete waiver of the attorney-client
privilege when the application alleges broad or general claims of
ineffective assistance.241 On September 21, 2009, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that trial counsel's complete
disclosure of the file was justified under the statute. 242 Moreover,
the court ruled that the allegations contained in the initial
application for PCR control the scope of the waiver, regardless of
any subsequent amendments.243 This ruling is problematic for a
number of reasons. First, in capital cases, the initial application
for post-conviction relief is routinely prepared by the Office of
Appellate Defense. At the time the application is prepared,
appellate defense does not have access to a copy of trial counsel's
files; does not have sufficient time to review the files even if it did
have access; and does not have the time, opportunity or funds to
conduct an investigation into potential post-conviction claims.
Moreover, the statute-and the supreme court's
interpretation of it-is not limited to capital cases. In non-
capital PCR cases, the inmates file their PCR applications pro se
prosecution. As a result of counsel's failure to make all
appropriate objections, applicant's death sentence is unreliable.
Joint Appendix to Writ of Certiorari at 11-12, Binney v. State, No. 26723 (S.C.
Sept. 21, 2009).
238. Id. at 24-26.
239. Id. at 45-46.
240. Id. at 88-89.
241. Id.
242. Binney v. State, No. 26723 (S.C. Sept. 21, 2009).
243. Id.
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and often include generally stated claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. As explained previously, Chief Justice Toal recently
ordered that the appointment of PCR counsel in non-capital cases
is appropriate only after the attorney general's office has filed its
return to the PCR application, in which the attorney general's
office must state whether or not it requests that counsel be
appointed for the applicant.244 Thus, the attorney general's office
could determine that a pro se PCR applicant has waived the
attorney-client privilege entirely and, further, that he or she is
not entitled to the appointment of counsel at all. Many
unsuspecting inmates could forfeit their right to protect the
attorney-client privilege simply by attempting to pursue post-
conviction relief-with no assistance from counsel at any time.
Such a system is unworkable, unreasonable, and unfair.
To prevent an overly broad waiver of the attorney-client
privilege while simultaneously protecting the inmate's right to
pursue post-conviction relief on all possible grounds, we
recommend that the allegations in the initial application contain
specific and narrowly pleaded claims whenever possible.
Further, where applicable, we recommend including a general
statement in the initial application that the inmate believes she
has additional claims for post-conviction relief, but does not yet
have collateral counsel, access to the discovery process, or funds
for expert services to investigate these claims. After post-
conviction counsel have been appointed and have had an
opportunity to investigate the applicant's potential claims,
counsel may amend the application to include additional
claims.245 The sample applications in Appendix C are designed to
address these issues.246
244. See Order Appointment, supra note 166.
245. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 15 (leave to amend "shall be freely given when
justice so requires").
246. App. C may be accessed at http://www.deathpenaltyresource.org/. In
addition to the pleading considerations discussed in this section, we also note
that the South Carolina Supreme Court recently determined, as a matter of
first impression, that S.C. R. Civ. P. 11, which authorizes sanctions for frivolous
pleadings, does not apply to PCR proceedings. Hiott v. State, 674 S.E.2d 491,
495 (S.C. 2009).
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B. Pleading Considerations for Federal Habeas Corpus
In raising issues in state post-conviction, counsel and pro se
applicants should keep in mind that federal habeas relief is
available to state prisoners only after they have exhausted their
claims in state court. 247 In other words, a state prisoner "must
give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he
presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition."248
"State courts, like federal courts, are obliged to enforce federal
law."249 The exhaustion doctrine requires that when a prisoner
alleges that his continued confinement for a state court
conviction violates federal law, the state courts must have the
first opportunity to review this claim and provide any necessary
relief.250 The purpose of the rule is to "reducef friction between
the state and federal court systems by avoiding the
'unseem[liness]' of a federal district court's overturning a state
court conviction without the state courts having had an
opportunity to correct the constitutional violation in the first
instance."251 To satisfy the exhaustion requirement, "state
prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to
resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round
of the State's established appellate review process."252 In South
Carolina, the exhaustion doctrine is satisfied if the claim has
been "fairly presented" once to the South Carolina Supreme
Court,253 and, probably, if the claim has been presented one time
to either the South Carolina Court of Appeals or the South
Carolina Supreme Court.254 For example, if the defendant raises
247. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b)(1), (c).
248. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).
249. Id. at 844.
250. E.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-16 (1982).
251. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 848. "The exhaustion doctrine.., turns on an inquiry into what
procedures are 'available' under state law." Id. at 847.
254. In In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction
Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454 (S.C. 1990) [hereinafter In re Exhaustion], the
South Carolina Supreme Court stated:
[I]n all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief
matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing and
2o0101 Post-Conviction Survival Skills
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the claim on direct appeal, he does not have to raise it again in
the state PCR proceedings.255 Furthermore, the exhaustion
doctrine is satisfied even if the state court does not fully consider
the claim, as long as it had a fair opportunity to do so because it
was reasonably informed of the nature of the claim.256 In
general, this means that the state courts must be given the
relevant facts and law and must be apprised that the claim rests,
certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in
order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies
respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been
presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief
has been denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all
available state remedies.
Id.; see also Ellison v. State, 676 S.E.2d 671, 672 (S.C. 2009) (holding that the
South Carolina Supreme Court will not entertain petitions for writs of certiorari
under S.C. APP. CT. R. 226, where the court of appeals has issued an order
denying a writ of certiorari in a PCR matter or when the court of appeals
initially grants certiorari but later dismisses the writ as improvidently granted
without further discussion, and further holding that this decision does not
preclude federal habeas corpus review). In O'Sullivan, the United States
Supreme Court held that a prisoner must seek discretionary review from the
Illinois Supreme Court after an adverse decision from the court of appeals
because discretionary review was an "available" state remedy in Illinois.
O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848 ("The creation of a discretionary review system does
not, without more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable.").
In its majority opinion, however, the Court also cited In re Exhaustion and
noted that "nothing in our decision today requires the exhaustion of any specific
state remedy when a State has provided that that remedy is unavailable." Id.
at 847; see also id. at 849-50 (Souter, J. concurring) (stating that the majority
opinion should not be read to require state prisoners to seek discretionary
review in order to satisfy the exhaustion doctrine, where states have clearly
indicated that they do not wish prisoners to do so for federal exhaustion
purposes); Id. at 861 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("Thankfully, the Court leaves
open the possibility that state supreme courts with discretionary dockets may
avoid a deluge of undesirable claims by making a plain statement - as . . .
South Carolina ha[s] done - that they do not wish the opportunity to review
such claims before they pass into the federal system.") (internal citations
omitted); Id. at 864 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (noting that "Justice Souter's
concurring opinion suggests that a federal habeas court should respect a State's
desire that prisoners not file petitions for discretionary review, where the State
has expressed the desire clearly").
255. E.g., Rose, 455 U.S. at 518.
256. See Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982) (per curiam); see also Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971) (discussing the requirements of the
exhaustion doctrine); Wise v. Warden, 839 F.2d 1030, 1033 (4th Cir. 1988)
(applying the exhaustion doctrine).
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in whole or in part, on the federal Constitution.257 Thus, for
pleading purposes, counsel should ensure that all grounds for
post-conviction relief fairly inform the court of the relevant facts
and the claim's federal constitutional basis.
For the same and other similar reasons, counsel should make
certain to plead on both substantive and ineffective assistance of
counsel grounds for un-objected trial error. For example, if trial
counsel fails to object to inadmissible testimonial hearsay
evidence, the application should allege ineffective assistance of
counsel for failure to object and properly preserve the claim for
appellate review and that the applicant's conviction or sentence
was obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment's
Confrontation Clause. Similarly, if trial counsel failed to
investigate, discover, and present evidence that a capital
defendant suffers from mental retardation, the application
should allege ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to
discover and present the evidence and that the applicant's death
sentence violates Atkins v. Virginia25S and the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution because the
applicant is mentally retarded.
VI. EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS
Evidentiary hearings are generally held during post-
conviction terms of court scheduled by the Office of Court
Administration. Most judicial circuits have two or more post-
conviction terms per year. In capital cases, hearings generally
take place at special terms of court requested by the attorney
general or scheduled with the consent of both parties.
At the hearing, the applicant, as the moving party, presents
his evidence first and has the burden to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to the relief
sought in the application.259 Any allegation that trial counsel
257. See Anderson, 459 U.S. at 4.
258. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
259. S.C. R. CIr. P. 71.1(e); see Cobbs v. State, 408 S.E.2d 223, 225 (S.C.
1991) (citing Griffin v. Warden, 286 S.E.2d 145 (S.C. 1982)); Butler v. State, 334
S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (citing Griffin v. Martin, 300 S.E.2d 482 (S.C. 1983)).
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was ineffective for failing to investigate, present evidence, or call
a witness must generally be supported by the applicant's own
evidence of what the omitted testimony would have been or what
the complete investigation would have produced. Applicants
routinely lose claims at the PCR stage for failing to offer evidence
to support the claim.260 The applicant may present evidence
through affidavits, depositions, and oral testimony.261 Sworn
affidavits are admissible in PCR proceedings in the discretion of
the trial judge.262 Thus, they are admissible and competent as
evidence under the statute. The use of affidavits can
significantly reduce the amount of time needed for the
evidentiary hearing and spare the court and potential witness
unnecessary inconvenience, particularly where a witness has
only a minor role to play in the overall hearing.
Pre-trial briefs can be helpful in introducing the court to the
relevant facts and law. Counsel should treat a PCR hearing as
she would any other civil non-jury trial. In many cases, the judge
presiding over the evidentiary hearing knows little or nothing
about the facts and circumstances of the case. A trial brief
summarizing the evidence presented at the applicant's trial and
260. See, e.g., Rollison v. State, 552 S.E.2d 290 (S.C. 2001) (applicant did not
establish that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to challenge the legality of
the weapons frisk that led to discovery of crack cocaine on applicant's person
where the applicant did not offer any evidence that the search was, in fact,
unconstitutional); Bannister v. State, 509 S.E.2d 807, 809 (S.C. 1998) ("PCR
applicant must produce the testimony of a favorable witness or otherwise offer
the testimony in accordance with the rules of evidence at the PCR hearing in
order to establish prejudice from the witness' failure to testify .... ") (emphasis
omitted); Palacio v. State, 511 S.E.2d 62, 66 (S.C. 1999) ("Since the contents of
these documents were never revealed at the PCR hearing, Defendant has failed
to present any evidence of probative value demonstrating how the failure to
obtain the unproduced statements or acquire the other documents in a more
timely fashion prejudiced the defense."); Moorehead v. State, 496 S.E.2d 415,
417 (S.C. 1998) ("Failure to conduct an independent investigation does not
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when the allegation is supported
only by mere speculation as to the result.").
261. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003); see Simpson v. Moore, 627 S.E.2d
701, 712 (S.C. 2006) (finding that the PCR court did not err in allowing the
applicant to introduce over forty depositions and approximately twenty-two
affidavits into evidence in lieu of live testimony).
262. Simpson, 627 S.E.2d at 712; Beckett v. State, 294 S.E.2d 46, 47 (S.C.
1982).
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introducing the court to the issues presented in the PCR
application can be invaluable to the court's understanding of the
case. 26 3 Similarly, if evidentiary issues will likely arise at the
hearing, counsel should prepare a memorandum or series of
memoranda on those issues.
VII. POST-HEARING PROCEDURE
A. In the PCR court
Counsel should seek leave to file a post-hearing brief in
complicated cases, cases involving the testimony of several
witnesses, those containing a number of issues, or other
appropriate cases. In such cases, it is also best to review the
transcript of the evidentiary hearing before preparing the post-
hearing brief. In capital PCR cases, counsel for both applicant
and the respondent typically file post-hearing briefs. Generally,
courts will allow a capital PCR applicant to file a post-hearing
brief within thirty to forty-five days after receipt of the hearing
transcript. The respondent receives a similar amount of time to
file a post-hearing brief in response to the applicant's.
The PCR court will issue its final decision in a written order.
The PCR Act requires the court's order to "make specific findings
of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each
issue presented."264 In order to preserve all issues for appellate
review, counsel must carefully review the final order and address
any insufficiency through a Rule 59(e) motion requesting the
PCR court to specifically address each issue raised in the
application.265 In several past cases, where the final order lacked
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has overlooked the failure to file a Rule
59(e) motion and remanded for specific findings (or, in some
cases, a new hearing) in order to address the pervasive problem
of inadequate orders.266 But, recently, the court made clear that
263. The authors will provide counsel with a sample pre-trial brief upon
request.
264. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003).
265. Marlar v. State, 653 S.E.2d 266, 267 (S.C. 2007) (per curiam).
266. See, e.g., McCullough v. State, 464 S.E.2d 340, 341 (S.C. 1995)
2010]
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this past practice would not continue, stating that its past
practice was a "unique" situation in which "the Court attempted
to remind circuit court judges and parties that: (1) specific
findings of fact and conclusions of law were required; and (2) a
Rule 59(e) motion must be filed if issues are not adequately
addressed in order to preserve the issues for appellate review."267
Despite these efforts, inadequate PCR orders continue to be a
problem: "Although the [past] cases apparently have not
accomplished the Court's goal, they do not change the general
rule that issues which are not properly preserved will not be
addressed on appeal."268
In addition to the situation when a court fails to address one
or more PCR issues, a Rule 59(e) motion may also be used when
the order contains an erroneous finding of fact, a misapplication
of law, or if there has been intervening authority relevant to an
issue in the case.
Counsel should keep in mind that courts will often ask the
prevailing party to prepare an order. When this occurs, counsel
should object to allowing the attorney general's office to prepare
the written order on the basis that the practice is disfavored by
the South Carolina Supreme Court, particularly in capital cases,
and it greatly increases the chances that the order will fail to
make appropriate and specific findings with respect to each issue
presented. The supreme court has said that it "strongly
encourage[s] PCR judges to draft their own findings of fact and
conclusions of law in death penalty cases."269 Even if the
objection is overruled and the court requests the prevailing party
(remanding matter to PCR court, despite the fact that no Rule 59(e) motion had
been filed, and admonishing all parties to carefully prepare and review PCR
orders to ensure that they specifically address the issues raised and make
conclusions of law); Pruitt v. State, 423 S.E.2d 127, 128 (S.C. 1992) (vacating
and remanding the PCR court's order, despite lack of Rule 59(e) motion, to
address the failure of many PCR orders to address all the issues raised);
McCray v. State, 408 S.E.2d 241, 241 (S.C. 1991) (reversing order denying
applicant relief and remanding for a new PCR hearing where PCR court's order
failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient for
appellate review).
267. Marlar, 653 S.E.2d at 267.
268. Id.
269. Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335, 341 (S.C. 2004).
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to draft the order, the court may only do so if "the other parties
are apprised of the request and are given an opportunity to
respond to the proposed findings and conclusions."270 Further,
the supreme court has repeatedly reminded all involved parties
that:
[c]ounsel preparing proposed orders should be meticulous in
doing so, opposing counsel should call any omissions to the
attention of the PCR judge prior to issuance of the order, and
the PCR judge should carefully review the order prior to
signing it. Even after an order is filed, counsel has an
obligation to review the order and file a Rule 59(e), SCRCP,
motion to alter or amend if the order fails to set forth the
findings and the reasons for those findings as required by § 17-
27-80 and Rule 52(a), SCRCP.271
A Rule 59(e) motion must be served within ten days of
receiving written notice of the entry of the order denying post-
conviction relief.272 Filing a Rule 59(e) motion also tolls the time
for filing a notice of intent to appeal.273
B. Appeal from the PCR Court's Decision
A final decision entered under the PCR Act is reviewable by
the South Carolina Supreme Court upon a petition for a writ of
certiorari by either party.274 To appeal from the denial of PCR
relief, counsel must serve a notice of appeal on opposing counsel
within thirty days after receipt of written notice of entry of the
order denying relief.275 If a timely Rule 59(e) motion to alter or
amend the judgment was filed, then the notice must be filed
thirty days after written notice of entry of the order denying the
motion.276 In some cases, the parties may wish to file cross-
appeals. In such a case, notice of the cross-appeal must be filed
270. Id. at 341 (quoting S.C. App. CT. R. 501, Cannon 3 B(7)(e)).
271. Pruitt, 423 S.E.2d at 128; see also Marlar, 653 S.E.2d at 267; Hall, 601
S.E.2d at 341.
272. S.C. R. CIV. P. 59(e).
273. S.C. R. CIV. P. 59(f).
274. S.C. App. CT. R. 243(a).
275. See S.C. App. CT. R. 243(b); S.C. App. CT. R. 203(b)(1).
276. S.C. App. CT. R. 203(b)(1).
2010]
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within five days after receipt of appellant's notice of appeal, or
within the thirty day time period described above, whichever is
later.277 The notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the
supreme court and the clerk of the PCR court within ten days
after it is served on opposing counsel.278 If the PCR court
determined that the post-conviction relief action is barred as
successive or untimely under the statute of limitations, counsel
must-at the time the notice of appeal is filed-provide a
sufficient explanation as to why the PCR court's determination
was improper.279
Counsel must order a transcript of the PCR hearing within
ten days of service of the notice of appeal. 280 Thirty days after
receipt of the transcript, the petitioner must serve an appendix
and a petition for writ of certiorari on opposing counsel and must
file an original and six copies of the petition, plus two copies of
the appendix and a proof of service with the clerk of the supreme
court. 28 1 The appendix must contain the entire PCR hearing
transcript, along with anything else in the PCR court record, a
copy of the final order, and an index of the items contained in the
appendix.282 The petition should include a list of the questions
presented for review, a statement of the relevant material facts,
and an argument in support of each question presented.23 The
petition may not exceed twenty-five pages in length without
leave of court.28 4 Counsel should be sure to raise every issue in
the petition for writ of certiorari to prevent procedural default in
federal habeas review. The State will have thirty days to serve a
return to the petition.25 The petitioner may file a brief reply to
the return if necessary. The supreme court's review is
discretionary.286 Full briefing and review will not be given unless
277. S.C. ApP. CT. R. 203(c).
278. S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(d)(1)(B).
279. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(c).
280. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(b); S.C. APP. CT. R. 207(a)(1).
281. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(d).
282. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(f).
283. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(e).
284. Id.
285. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(g).
286. Austin v. State, 409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (S.C. 1991) (per curiam); Knight v.
[Volume 4
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the court grants a writ of certiorari.287 The court may choose to
grant certiorari to consider some, but not all, of the issues raised
in the petition. If the court grants a writ of certiorari, the court
will set out a schedule for briefs on the merits.
Different rules apply if the PCR court finds that the
applicant was denied the right to a direct appeal of his
conviction. In such circumstances, the applicant will be entitled
to a belated review of direct appeal issues.288 In White v. State,
the South Carolina Supreme Court held that trial counsel is
obligated to make certain that a defendant is aware of his right
to appeal his conviction.289 In the absence of an "intelligent
waiver" by the defendant, counsel should perfect an appeal by
either pursuing an appeal on the defendant's behalf or, if
appropriate, complying with the procedure set forth in Anders v.
California.290 If a defendant did not fully, voluntarily, and
intelligently waive his right to appeal or trial counsel otherwise
failed to properly perfect the appeal, the following procedure
applies:
(1) When the post-conviction relief judge has affirmatively
found that the right to a direct appeal was not knowingly and
intelligently waived, the petition shall contain a question
raising this issue along with all other post-conviction relief
issues petitioner seeks to have reviewed. At the same time the
petition is served, petitioner shall serve and file a brief
addressing the direct appeal issues. This brief shall, to the
extent possible, comply with the requirements of Rule 208(b).
Respondent's return to the petition shall address the post-
conviction relief issues, including whether the direct appeal
was knowingly and intelligently waived. At the same time the
return is due, respondent shall also serve and file a brief
addressing the direct appeal issues. Within ten (10) days after
service of respondent's brief, petitioner may file a reply brief on
State, 325 S.E.2d 535, 537 (S.C. 1985) (per curiam); see also White v. State, 208
S.E.2d 35, 39 (S.C. 1974).
287. See Order Appointment, supra note 166.
288. See, e.g., Sheppard v. State, 594 S.E.2d 462, 466 (S.C. 2004) (finding
applicant was entitled to a belated appeal where his decision not to pursue
direct appeal was based on erroneous advice from trial counsel).
289. 208 S.E.2d at 39.
290. 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).
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the direct appeal issues.
(2) When the post-conviction relief judge has found that
the applicant is not entitled to a White v. State review, the
petition shall raise the question of waiver of the right to a
direct appeal along with all other post-conviction relief issues
petitioner seeks to have reviewed. The petition shall also
contain a "Statement of Issues on Appeal" listing the issues to
be raised if a White v. State review is granted; this statement of
issues shall comply with the requirements of Rule 208(b)(1)(B).
Briefing of the direct appeal issues will not be allowed unless
certiorari is granted on the issue.291
C. Successive Applications
The PCR Act requires applicants to assert "all grounds for
relief available" in the original application.292 Second, or
successive, applications are disfavored and the South Carolina
Supreme Court has repeatedly voiced hostility toward them.293 A
successive PCR application is one that raises grounds not raised
in a prior application, raises grounds previously heard and
determined, or raises grounds waived in prior proceedings. The
Act provides a very narrow exception to allow a successive PCR
application where the applicant can provide a "sufficient reason"
for why the ground was not asserted or was inadequately raised
in the original application.294 The court has strictly construed
the term "sufficient reason," holding that it means that the
ground "could not have been raised" in the previous
application.295 Thus, "as long as it was possible to raise the
291. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(i).
292. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (2003).
293. See, e.g., Aice v. State, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (S.C. 1991); Carter v. State,
362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987); Land v. State, 262 S.E.2d 735, 737 (S.C. 1980).
294. § 17-27-90.
295. Odom v. State, 523 S.E.2d 753, 755 (S.C. 1999); Tilley v. State, 511
S.E.2d 689, 691 (S.C. 1999). Although no South Carolina court has explicitly
addressed the question, the authors believe that circumstances satisfying the
PCR Act's exceptions to the statute of limitations (i.e., a new retroactive rule of
law and newly discovered evidence as defined by S.C. CODE ANN. section 17-27-
45 (2003)) should invariably qualify as a "sufficient reason" permitting a
successive petition. C.f. Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606 & n.7 (S.C.
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
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argument in [the] first PCR application, an applicant may not
raise it in a successive application."296 The court has rejected the
argument that a claim was not raised in the original petition
because PCR counsel ineffectively failed to raise it, stating that
the court "will not engage in an exploration of why the grounds
were not raised, it is sufficient that they could have been raised,
but were not."297
There are some exceptions to the general bar against
successive petitions. The court has allowed a successive PCR
application where the applicant's first PCR application was
dismissed without assistance of legal counsel and without a
hearing;298 where the applicant's trial counsel served as his PCR
counsel, thus effectively preventing a claim of ineffective
assistance;299 where the applicant did not have direct review of a
claim he brought in PCR due to "so many procedural
irregularities;"300 and where the applicant was denied his right to
appeal the denial of his PCR application.301 In Aice v. State, the
court explained that every PCR applicant is entitled to a full
adjudication on the merits of the PCR application-or "one bite
at the apple"-which includes the right to appeal the denial of a
PCR application and the right to assistance of counsel in that
appeal.302 Thus, if a PCR applicant requested and was denied an
opportunity to seek appellate review from a PCR denial, or if the
right to appeal was not knowingly and intelligently waived, an
applicant can petition for certiorari to the South Carolina
2003) (per curiam) (allowing an issue to be raised for the first time in a second
PCR application in light of a new retroactive rule of law).
296. Aice, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
297. Id.
298. Case v. State, 289 S.E.2d 413, 413-14 (S.C. 1982).
299. Carter v. State, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (S.C. 1987).
300. Washington v. State, 478 S.E.2d 833, 835 (S.C. 1996).
301. Austin v. State, 409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (S.C. 1991) (per curiam). The
South Carolina Supreme Court has also suggested that a mentally incompetent
PCR applicant should, after regaining competency, be allowed to raise issues in
a successive proceeding that could not have been raised earlier because of
incompetency. Council v. Catoe, 597 S.E.2d 782, 787 (S.C. 2004). The court has
said that such claims must be "fact-based" and that the applicant's
incompetency must prevent the applicant from aiding his PCR counsel on that
fact-based claim. Id.
302. Aice, 409 S.E.2d at 395.
2010]
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Supreme Court for a new appeal.303 Finally, a successive
application may be permitted where the court's refusal to hear
the claim would constitute a "gross miscarriage of justice,"304
where government interference or the reasonable unavailability
of the factual basis of the claim impeded counsel's ability to raise
the claim,305 or where some other circumstance beyond the
applicant's control occurred.306
VIII. OTHER AVAILABLE REMEDIES
A. State Habeas Corpus
The availability of state habeas corpus has been limited by
the PCR Act. The Act supersedes and encompasses the common
law practice of habeas corpus.307  However, habeas corpus
remains available as an "extraordinary" constitutional remedy in
certain narrow circumstances.308 Habeas corpus is available only
when other remedies, such as PCR, are inadequate or
unavailable.39 The PCR Act is considered "broadly inclusive"
and will rarely be inadequate or unavailable to test the legality of
a detention.310 Not every constitutional error at trial will justify
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The writ will only issue
when the petitioner's claim meets the Butler standard-meaning
that a violation has occurred "which, in the setting, constitutes a
denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of
justice."311 The South Carolina Supreme Court has granted the
303. Id. To effectuate an applicant's right to appeal a PCR dismissal, the
supreme court requires PCR judges to advise pro se applicants of both their
right to appeal and also their right to appellate counsel when their PCR
applications are summarily dismissed. Odom v. State, 523 S.E.2d 753, 756
(S.C. 1999).
304. Aice, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
305. See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 468 (1991).
306. Id. at 503.
307. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b) (2003).
308. Gibson v. State, 495 S.E.2d 426, 428 (S.C. 1998).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Butler v. State, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (S.C 1990) (italics omitted) (quoting
State v. Miller, 84 A.2d 459, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1951)).
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writ in only a handful of cases. 312
Procedurally, a petitioner seeking state habeas corpus must
first exhaust all available PCR remedies.313 Exhaustion includes
the filing of an application, the rendering of an order
adjudicating the issues, and petitioning for or knowingly waiving
appellate review.314 If a petitioner has exhausted PCR remedies,
he may file a petition for habeas corpus. The petition must allege
that the petitioner has exhausted all other remedies, and it must
set out a constitutional claim that meets the Butler standard.315
It must allege sufficient facts to show why other remedies, such
as PCR, are unavailable or inadequate. Further, the petition
must make out a prima facie case showing that petitioner is
entitled to relief, including sufficient factual allegations to
support the petition.316 If the petition does not satisfy the
requirements for habeas corpus, the court may treat it as a PCR
application.317
B. Motion for New Trial Based on After-Discovered Evidence
A motion for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence
encompasses claims predicated on the presentation of evidence
that existed at the time of trial but of which the defendant was
"excusably ignorant."318 The after-discovered evidence must
reflect upon the defendant's innocence or the defendant's moral
culpability in capital cases.319 Generally, a motion for a new trial
312. See Tucker v. Catoe, 552 S.E.2d 712, 718 (S.C. 2001); Slack v. State,
429 S.E.2d 801, 802 (S.C. 1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry,
610 S.E.2d 494 (S.C. 2005); Butler, 397 S.E.2d at 88.
313. Pennington v. State, 441 S.E.2d 315, 316 (S.C. 1994).
314. Gibson v. State, 495 S.E.2d 426, 428 (S.C. 1998).
315. Id. at 429 (citing Butler, 397 S.E.2d at 88).
316. Id. at 427. The South Carolina Supreme Court recently entertained a
state habeas claim by Petitioner, Luke Williams, a death-sentenced inmate,
who argued that his death sentence was in violation of the court's recent
decision in State v. Northcutt, 641 S.E.2d 873, 881-82 (S.C. 2007), related to an
improper closing argument by the State. Williams v. Ozmint, 671 S.E.2d 600,
602-03 (S.C. 2008). Following briefing and oral argument, however, the court
ultimately denied Williams a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 603.
317. See Hunter v. State, 447 S.E.2d 203 (S.C. 1994).
318. State v. Haulcomb, 195 S.E.2d 601, 606 (S.C. 1973).
319. See State v. South, 427 S.E.2d 666, 669-70 (S.C. 1993).
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should be considered when new evidence is discovered shortly
after the trial has concluded or when new evidence is discovered
after the completion of state PCR.320
"To obtain a new trial based on after-discovered evidence,"
the petitioner must file a motion pursuant to South Carolina
Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(b) "[s]howing that the evidence: 1)
would probably change the result if a new trial is had; 2) has
been discovered since the trial; 3) could not have been discovered
before trial; 4) is material to the issue of guilt or innocence; and
5) is not merely cumulative or impeaching."21
If the petitioner alleges that after-discovered evidence affects
the penalty in a capital case, the evidence "must be material to
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances," as opposed to the
defendant's guilt or innocence.322 The petitioner bears the
burden of proof and must satisfy each element for the court to
grant the motion.323 The motion must be filed before the trial
court with jurisdiction over the conviction.324 The provisions of
Rule 29(b) place no time limitations on a motion for new trial
based on after-discovered evidence325 but do require that it be
filed within a reasonable time after discovery of the evidence.326
The motion must be supported by affidavits and, if available,
320. Where such evidence is discovered while PCR proceedings are pending,
the claim should typically be included in the PCR application. See Simpson v.
Moore, 627 S.E.2d 701, 708 (S.C. 2006) (holding that applicant was entitled to
amend his PCR application to include a claim that the State failed to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence related to the charged offense of armed
robbery, where the evidence was discovered during the PCR hearing).
321. State v. Taylor, 508 S.E.2d 870, 879 (S.C. 1998); see also S.C. R. CRIM.
P. 29(b).
322. South, 427 S.E.2d at 670.
323. See Hayden v. State, 299 S.E.2d 854, 855 (S.C. 1983).
324. See S.C. R. CRIM. P. 29.
325. See State v. Spann, 513 S.E.2d 98, 100 (S.C. 1999) (granting motion for
new trial where new evidence was discovered eighteen years after the original
trial); see also State v. Hinson, 361 S.E.2d 120, 121-22 (S.C. 1987) (granting
defendant thirty days to renew his motion for a new trial on the basis of non-
disclosure of evidence, where the trial judge had failed to rule on that motion,
which had been made immediately following trial).
326. Town of Hilton Head Island v. Godwin, 634 S.E.2d 59, 61-62 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2006) (finding defendant's motion to set aside the conviction untimely
where it was filed approximately eight years after he received notice of the
evidence on which the motion was based).
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 278 2009-2010
other relevant evidence. The moving party must also submit a
personal affidavit supporting the motion, declaring "that he did
not know of the existence of such evidence at the time of the trial
and that he used due diligence to discover such evidence, or that
he could not have discovered it by the exercise of due
diligence."327 The trial judge has broad discretion to either grant
or deny the motion, and her decision will not be reversed on
appeal unless the defendant can show that it meets the onerous
"abuse of discretion" standard.328
IX. ONCLUSION
We hope that this article will directly serve as a resource to
appointed counsel, pro se litigants, judges, and law clerks
involved with post-conviction cases in South Carolina. Moreover,
we hope that our discussion of the complexities of the PCR Act
and the many pitfalls into which a PCR applicant could fall will
highlight the need to afford applicants greater access to well-
trained and well-funded post-conviction counsel, investigators,
and experts-and curb enthusiasm for placing even more
restrictions on an already burdened, overlooked, and under-
represented class of inmates seeking post-conviction relief in
South Carolina.
327. State v. DeAngelis, 182 S.E.2d 732, 735 (S.C. 1971).
328. See, e.g., State v. Edens, 250 S.E.2d 116, 118 (S.C. 1978); State v.
Pierce, 207 S.E.2d 414, 417 (S.C. 1974).
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I. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Statute Providing for Magistrate Court Jurisdiction
Robertson v. State, 278 S.E.2d 770 (S.C. 1981). Statute
providing that crime of passing fraudulent checks "may be tried"
in magistrate's court if check is for $100 or less, required
prosecution of check for $54 to take place in magistrate's court,
and court of general sessions lacked jurisdiction over such
offense. Id. at 771.
B. Invalid Transfer of Juvenile to General Sessions
Austin v. State, 575 S.E.2d 547 (S.C. 2003). The applicant
was fifteen years old when he was charged with armed robbery,
assault and battery with intent to kill, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The family
court transferred jurisdiction of the offenses to general sessions
and the applicant plead guilty. The applicant was denied PCR
relief but granted a belated review of his direct appeal under
White v. State. The court held that possession of a firearm
during commission of a violent crime is not a felony enumerated
in S.C. Code § 20-7-430(5). Only the offenses specifically
enumerated in the statute may be waived up to the court of
general sessions. Because the offense of possession of a firearm
during commission of a violent crime may not be waived up for
fourteen or fifteen year olds, the circuit court was without
jurisdiction over the charge and the plea and sentence to
possession of a firearm was vacated.
Slocumb v. State, 522 S.E.2d 809 (S.C. 1999). Trial court
had no jurisdiction where thirteen year old charged with criminal
sexual conduct was transferred to general sessions and offered
guilty plea. S.C. Code § 16-3-659 prohibits the transfer of sexual
offenses committed by juveniles under fourteen years of age to
adult court.
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C. No Valid Waiver of Indictment Prior to Plea
Phillips v. State, 314 S.E.2d 313 (S.C. 1984). "Failure of
defendant, indicted for kidnapping and robbery, to sign waiver of
indictment invalidated his guilty plea to assault and battery of a
high and aggravated nature and robbery." Id. at 313. Sections
17-23-130 and -140 make a written waiver of presentment of
indictments not presented to the grand jury mandatory before
the trial judge can accept the plea.
D. Plea to Offense Not Charged in the Indictment
Campbell v. State, 535 S.E.2d 928 (S.C. 2000). Trial court
had no jurisdiction where defendant was indicted for Criminal
Sexual Conduct (CSC) with a minor but pled guilty to lewd act on
child under the age of sixteen. Lewd act is not a lesser included
offense of criminal sexual conduct, and grand jury never indicted
defendant on lewd act and defendant did not waive indictment.
E. Invalid Amendments That Change the Indicted Offense
Hope v. State, 492 S.E.2d 76 (S.C. 1997). Trial court had no
jurisdiction where defendant was indicted for assault with intent
to commit third degree criminal sexual assault, but the court
allowed the State to amend the indictment at trial to assault
with intent to commit first degree criminal sexual assault.
Because the nature of the offense was changed, the court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction.
Clair v. State, 478 S.E.2d 54 (S.C. 1996). Trial court had no
jurisdiction to accept guilty plea to trafficking in cocaine between
200 and 400 grams where the defendant was indicted for between
100 and 200 grams and the indictment was amended prior to the
plea. Because the maximum penalty was increased, the nature
of the offense was changed and the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.
F. Failure to Re-Indict Following Nolle Prosequi
Mackey v. State, 595 S.E.2d 241 (S.C. 2004). Trial court
"should have dismissed the criminal charges, because the
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solicitor entered a nolle prosequi and thereafter failed to re-indict
the defendant upon those charges." Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
II. GUILTY PLEA INVALID BECAUSE NOT KNOWING AND
INTELLIGENT
Clark v. State, 468 S.E.2d 653 (S.C. 1996). Defendant
already serving a federal sentence entered plea based on an
agreement accepted by the court that his South Carolina
sentences would run concurrent with federal sentence. Because
he was being held in a South Carolina prison, however, the
federal sentence was not running. Court reversed denial of PCR
and ordered that defendant be moved to federal prison where his
federal sentence would begin running, or in the alternative, if the
federal prison would not take him, to allow defendant to
withdraw his guilty plea because the State could not fulfill its
pretrial agreement.
Brown v. State, 412 S.E.2d 399 (S.C. 1991). Remanded for
new trial where defendant's guilty plea was not made knowingly
and voluntarily. Trial judge misinformed defendant at guilty
plea hearing that he would be eligible for parole after serving one
third of his sentence, when in fact defendant was ineligible for
parole.
Dover v. State, 405 S.E.2d 391 (S.C. 1991). Defendant's
guilty plea was not voluntarily and understandingly made
because he was never made aware that he could be sentenced to
as much as 200 years. Judge did not ask defendant any factual
questions or question him about the possibility of a severe
sentence, and defendant testified that he was led to believe that
it was not a major case and he would not get more than ten
years.
III. RIGHT TO COUNSEL ISSUES
A. Denial of Counsel
Barlet v. State, 343 S.E.2d 620 (S.C. 1986). Petitioner had a
right to counsel at probation revocation hearing and was
unlawfully detained without a finding of willful refusal to pay
283
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probation fees and restitution.
B. Denial of Counsel at Critical Stage of Proceedings
McKnight v. State, 465 S.E.2d 352 (S.C. 1995). Defendant
convicted of resisting arrest and criminal domestic violence was
denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings. Defense
counsel was not in courtroom during the testimony of the police
officer, who was the victim of the resisting arrest, and came in
during the defendant's cross examination of the officer. There
was no waiver of right to counsel. Court held that Strickland
standard used by PCR judge was inappropriate and that
prejudice would be presumed.
Locklear v. Harvey, 254 S.E.2d 293 (S.C. 1979). "Where
defense counsel was excluded from a meeting between trial
judge, rape victim, her mother, and solicitor, and discussion was
off the record, defendant's right to counsel at sentencing was
effectively denied." Id. at 293. Remand for resentencing by
another circuit judge was required.
C. Insufficient Warning of Dangers of Waiver of Right to
Counsel and Pro Se Representation
Gardner v. State, 570 S.E.2d 184 (S.C. 2002). PCR court
erred in finding that petitioner knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel prior to entering guilty plea to drug
charges. Following arrest, petitioner retained counsel but could
not afford legal fees. He discussed a plea with the solicitor and
entered a plea with no lawyer present. The trial court judge
conducted no inquiry and did not even acknowledge that no
counsel was present. While the record revealed that the
petitioner was aware of his right to counsel, there was no
indication that he was aware of the dangers of self-
representation.
Watts v. State, 556 S.E.2d 368 (S.C. 2001). Trial judge did
not effectively warn the defendant of the dangers of appearing
pro se to plead guilty; the judge did not ask why the defendant
dismissed the appointed attorney or if he wished to have counsel
present, and the defendant did not say that he wished to waive
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his right to counsel or he wanted to represent himself. The court
also failed to make a meaningful inquiry into defendant's
background to determine whether he had sufficient experience or
knowledge to waive counsel at a guilty plea proceeding. The
judge asked the defendant for his age and education level and
about his first offense; the defendant answered that he was forty-
one years old and had graduated from high school, and the
solicitor answered the question about a prior conviction.
Stevenson v. State, 522 S.E.2d 343 (S.C. 1999). The record
did not "demonstrate petitioner was sufficiently aware of the
dangers of self-representation to make an informed decision to
proceed pro se during the plea proceeding and probation
revocation hearing." Id. at 345. Thus, petitioner did not validly
waive her right to counsel as no one informed petitioner of
dangers and disadvantages of proceeding pro se, petitioner did
not have a high school education, and she had appeared in court
only one time prior to these proceedings.
Bridwell v. State, 413 S.E.2d 30 (S.C. 1992). Defendant's
waiver of right to counsel at trial was not knowing and voluntary
where the defendant was not warned of the dangers inherent in
self-representation, and there was no evidence that he was
otherwise aware of hazards of proceeding pro se.
Salley v. State, 410 S.E.2d 921 (S.C. 1991). Trial court did
not properly find that defendant had waived her right to counsel
at probation revocation hearing. He did not ask specific questions
to determine if she was aware of the dangers of self-
representation, and the record indicated that she agreed to
proceed without counsel only on the belief that her probation
officer would try to get the probation vacated.
Huckaby v. State, 408 S.E.2d 242 (S.C. 1991). Judge's two
questions at probation revocation hearing, which merely told
probationer of his right to counsel and asked if he wished to
waive it, did not satisfy requirement of a hearing to determine
whether the waiver of the right to counsel was knowing and
intelligent. Petitioner was operating under false impressions
regarding the importance of the hearing and the dangers of self-
representation.
Prince v. State, 392 S.E.2d 462 (S.C. 1990). Defendant was
not sufficiently aware of dangers of self representation to make
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informed decision to proceed pro se, where defendant was
mentally disturbed and exhibited little understanding of criminal
proceedings.
Wroten v. State, 391 S.E.2d 575 (S.C. 1990). Evidence at
PCR proceeding did not demonstrate that petitioner was
sufficiently aware of the dangers of self-representation to make
an informed decision to proceed pro se. The evidence showed
that petitioner was forty-five years old, had a fifth grade
education, and when the trial judge asked him if he wanted
counsel, he said he "didn't know what to do." Id. at 577.
IV. STATE MISCONDUCT AND PRESENTATION OF FALSE
EVIDENCE
Riddle v. Ozmint, 631 S.E.2d 70 (S.C. 2006) (per curiam).
There was no evidence supporting the PCR court's finding that
Brady v. Maryland was not violated and reversal was required
because the State's primary witness, the defendant's co-
defendant/brother who was seventeen years old at the time of the
trial and also mildly mentally retarded, testified falsely that he
had not made any statements other than the initial statement
that was disclosed to the defense. The witness had made a prior
inconsistent statement that was not disclosed to the defense, and
the solicitor failed to correct this false testimony. The PCR judge
found that the State did not violate due process because the
solicitor may have thought either that the witness misunderstood
the questions or that he simply did not recall the recent events.
This was error because "[t]he issue is not why [the witness] failed
to tell the truth: rather, it is why the solicitor, who knew [the]
testimony to be false, failed to correct it." Id. at 75. Reversal was
required because "[t]he failure to correct false evidence is as
reprehensible as its presentation." Id.
Simpson v. Moore, 627 S.E.2d 701 (S.C. 2006). The trial
court erred in denying relief because the State failed to disclose
potentially exculpatory evidence related to the armed robbery
charge, which was also a statutory aggravating circumstance.
When police arrived at the crime scene, the cash register was
open and there were bills in every slot except where the twenty-
dollar bills were kept. There was also a bag of money behind the
286
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register, which was given to the victim's brother, who helped run
the store. The existence of the bag of money was never disclosed
to defense counsel. The State's misconduct was prejudicial.
Simpson was granted a new trial on the armed robbery charge.
If convicted, a new capital sentencing would also be necessary,
because the armed robbery was the sole aggravating
circumstance.
Sprouse v. State, 585 S.E.2d 278 (S.C. 2003). The court
found that the State failed to honor its plea agreement where the
defendant had charges in both Newberry and Laurens Counties
and entered into an agreement to plead guilty in exchange for
concurrent sentences. When he entered the first plea agreement
in Newberry as violent, the solicitor stated his understanding
that the subsequent sentences in Laurens would be nonviolent,
yet the Laurens solicitor classified the offenses as violent. This
could only be interpreted as a deviation from the original plea
agreement because both solicitors represented the Eigth Judicial
Circuit and were each bound to fulfill the plea agreements made
by the other. The case was remanded for resentencing in
Laurens consistent with the original plea agreement.
Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320 (S.C. 1999). Defendant was
entitled to a new trial despite his guilty plea based on the State's
failure to disclose a witness's inconsistent statement and trip to
crime scene. Defendant was charged with murder. He and one
eye witness said he had hit the victim in the head with the gun
while holding the butt of the gun but not the trigger. The gun
accidentally fired and shot the victim who died. The victim's
girlfriend, however, stated that she had been looking through the
window of the bar where this occurred and saw the defendant
point the pistol at the victim and shoot him. Four other
witnesses told the police that the girlfriend had been sitting in
her car or near it at the time of the shooting and ran inside only
after the shot was fired. Defense counsel knew these facts and
told the defendant they would likely impeach the girlfriend's
testimony, but the defendant opted to plead guilty to voluntary
manslaughter. What the defense did not know, however, was
that after the initial statement, the police had taken the
girlfriend to the crime scene and confronted her with the fact
that she could not have seen through the window because the
2010]
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pictures revealed that there was a game machine in front of the
window at the time of the shooting. The girlfriend then said that
she must have seen it through the door instead of the window.
The court held that the trip to the scene and the material change
in the testimony should have been disclosed to the defense.
Reversal was also required because there is a big difference
between thinking you can impeach the witness and knowing that
the State has established the witness's initial statement was
untrue, which prompted the victim to change her statement. The
court adopts the rule that "a Brady violation is material [in the
context of a guilty plea case] when there is a reasonable
probability that, but for the government's failure to disclose
Brady evidence, the defendant would have refused to plead guilty
and gone to trial." Id. at 325.
Washington v. State, 478 S.E.2d 833 (S.C. 1996).
Defendant was entitled to new trial in a successive PCR
application where the State declared in an opening statement
that there was no deal with the State's witness and there was
testimony that there was no deal when, in fact, there was a plea
agreement between the witness and the State. The court granted
relief even though this was a successive PCR application, because
Washington had not received due process due to a number of
procedural abnormalities, including his attorney's failure to
adequately file direct appeal brief and the first PCR court's
passing buck to the supreme court even though finding State
misconduct.
V. SENTENCING ERRORS
A. Invalid Sentence for Kidnapping Where Defendant Also
Sentenced for Murder
Owens v. State, 503 S.E.2d 462 (S.C. 1998). Defendant was
convicted of kidnapping in 1985 and sentenced to life. Based on
the same facts, he was convicted of murder in 1986 and
sentenced to death. After reversal and a retrial on the murder
charge, he was again convicted and sentenced to life in 1991. At
the time of his 1991 conviction and sentence, the kidnapping
punishment statute required a life sentence unless the defendant
[Volume 4
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was also sentenced to life for murder. Because there is no
requirement in the statute that the defendant be tried and
sentenced for kidnapping and murder at the same time for the
statute to apply, the life sentence for kidnapping should have
been vacated once the defendant was convicted and sentenced for
the associated murder. The kidnapping sentence was vacated.
B. Invalid Sentencing as Second Offender
Rainey v. State, 414 S.E.2d 131 (S.C. 1992). Defendant was
improperly sentenced as a second offender when conflict in the
statutes must be resolved in favor of the later, more specific
statute, which excluded defendant's earlier convictions from
counting to classify him as a "second offender."
C. Sentencing Beyond the Maximum Allowed
Williams v. State, 410 S.E.2d 563 (S.C. 1991). Defendant
pled guilty to assault and battery with intent to kill and received
extra punishment for displaying "what appeared to be a knife"
during the attack. Id. at 563. The instrument was actually a
barbecue fork, and the trial court was without jurisdiction to
accept the plea because the statute clearly states that the
weapon involved must be a knife, not what "appears to be a
knife." Id. at 564.
Fewell v. State, 225 S.E.2d 853 (S.C. 1976). Defendant was
sentenced as if he had been convicted of possession with the
intent to distribute LSD rather than the simple possession
charge for which he was indicted and convicted. Counsel's failure
to object to the erroneous instruction regarding applicable
punishment did not deprive defendant of the right to be
sentenced appropriately. The case was remanded for
resentencing.
D. Unreasonable Condition of Probation
Beckner v. State, 373 S.E.2d 469 (S.C. 1988) (per curiam).
Condition of probation that defendant not be "in a place of
business that sells alcohol" was unreasonable and
disproportionate to any rehabilitative function it may have
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served. Id. at 470 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Henry v. State, 280 S.E.2d 536 (S.C. 1981). Trial judge was
without authority to impose banishment from the State in the
event that probation was revoked as a condition of probation,
even though defendant agreed to the sentence. Defendant did
not lack standing to assert this issue in PCR despite the fact that
he had not yet violated his probation.
VI. SENTENCE CREDIT ISSUES
Allen v. State, 529 S.E.2d 541 (S.C. 2000). Petitioner
entitled to sentence credit on initial charge for time served in
confinement following bond revocation and additional charges
until trial on all charges.
Blakeney v. State, 529 S.E.2d 9 (S.C. 2000). Petitioner
entitled to sentence credit for time served in confinement
between arrest and conviction.
Crooks v. State, 485 S.E.2d 374 (S.C. 1997). Petitioner
entitled to sentence credit for time served in confinement
between arrest and conviction.
VII. PAROLE ISSUES
Kerr v. State, 547 S.E.2d 494 (S.C. 2001). PCR court had
jurisdiction to review issue concerning unlawful revocation of
parole because PCR statute specifically allows consideration of
this issue. Parole was unlawfully revoked based on parole
board's improper interpretation of statute concerning parole
eligibility applicable at the time. Applicant had been sentenced
to "mandatory term" of twenty-five years for drug offense and
statute provided at the time that parole eligibility was denied
only if sentenced to "mandatory minimum" of twenty-five years.
Id. at 496.
Jernigan v. State, 531 S.E.2d 507 (S.C. 2000). Statute that
changed review for parole eligibility from annual to biannual
review violated ex post facto clauses of federal and state
constitutions, because the procedural rule is so overly intrusive
that it substantively affects the review standard. Issue
remanded to administrative agency, because under recent Al-
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Shabazz ruling, ex post facto claims concerning parole eligibility
are no longer cognizable in PCR unless specifically allowed in
statute.
Griffin v. State, 433 S.E.2d 862 (S.C. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1093 (1994). Statute that changed review for parole
eligibility from annual to biannual review violated ex post facto
clauses of federal and state constitutions because the procedural
rule is so overly intrusive that it substantively affects the review
standard.
VIII. WAIVER OF DIRECT APPEAL INVALID
Braddock v. State, 545 S.E.2d 498 (S.C. 2001). Voluntary
absence from trial does not waive right to direct appeal when
defendant is in custody at the time of sentencing and direct
appeal. Direct appeal issues considered and affirmed.
Luckett v. State, 462 S.E.2d 858 (S.C. 1995) (per curiam).
Petitioner "did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
a direct appeal." Id. at 858. Court reviewed direct appeal issues
and affirmed.
Casey v. State, 409 S.E.2d 391 (S.C. 1991). Court held that
trial court erred in refusing to charge law on involuntary
manslaughter where there was evidence of a struggle over a gun
between defendant and third person which resulted in victim
being shot.
Matthews v. State, 387 S.E.2d 258 (S.C. 1990). After PCR
judge found that there had been ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, briefs were allowed on direct appeal issues and
the court held, that because of double jeopardy, defendant could
not be convicted of both trafficking in marijuana and the lesser
included offense of possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute.
Davis v. State, 342 S.E.2d 60 (S.C. 1986). Six step procedure
was adopted to be applied when it is found that defendant did not
knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to direct appeal from
conviction and subsequently seeks review of issues which arose
at trial.
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IX. COMPETENCY TO BE EXECUTED
Singleton v. State, 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993). Defendant
convicted of murder was incompetent to be executed because he
was completely unaware that he was capable of dying in the
electric chair and was incapable of communicating with counsel.
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I. TRIAL PHASE
A. Numerous Deficiencies and Inadequate Defense
Lounds v. State, 670 S.E.2d 646 (S.C. 2008). Counsel, who
has since been suspended from the practice of law indefinitely for
other reasons, was ineffective in armed robbery and kidnapping
trial for failing to adequately investigate and present the defense
and for making harmful arguments contradictory to the
petitioner's testimony in closing. Counsel's conduct was deficient
because counsel did not speak to petitioner until the morning the
trial began and admitted on the record that he had just learned
the name of possible defense witnesses, who were not called
because they could not be located during the trial and because
counsel "believed the witnesses would not add much to
petitioner's defense." Id. at 650. Even if this could be considered
as a strategic reason, it was "not objectively reasonable given the
defense theory of the case." Id. In essence, the petitioner
testified that he asked the alleged victim for money owed to him
due to previous drug dealings, and the victim went with him
voluntarily to the victim's parent's house to get money. The
victim denied knowing the petitioner, owing him money, or ever
buying or using drugs. The defense witnesses the petitioner
sought during trial, and who testified in PCR, would have
testified that the victim did know the petitioner through drug
dealing, which "would have added significantly to the credibility
of petitioner's case." Id. Counsel's conduct was also deficient in
closing argument for asserting that the petitioner had a friend
with him for extra "muscle" when the defendant had denied
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
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robbery or kidnapping or any attempt to threaten the victim. Id.
at 651. Prejudice was found on each individual count because the
jury necessarily rejected the victim's testimony in acquitting on
the armed robbery.
McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 2008). Counsel
found ineffective for numerous reasons in retrial of homicide by
child abuse involving a full-term stillborn baby with cocaine in its
system. The initial autopsy listed three causes of death, one of
which was cocaine consumption. The State's theory was that
other causes were ruled out and the cocaine use alone caused the
death. In an initial trial, the defense presented two experts. The
first completely contradicted the State's theory, testified that the
cocaine studies the State's experts relied on were outdated, and
ruled on cocaine as a cause of death. The second ruled out other
causes, but could not rule out cocaine, which the State argued
effectively supported the State's theory. The first trial resulted
in a mistrial due to jury misconduct after seven hours of
deliberations. In the second trial, the same defense counsel did
not call the first defense expert because he was unavailable and
recalled only the second that supported the State's theory, which
resulted in conviction after only thirty minutes of deliberations.
Counsel was ineffective both in calling the defense expert that
undermined the defense and in failing to call the same (by
obtaining a continuance or videotaped testimony) or a different
available (and local) expert that supported the defense theory.
Counsel was also ineffective in failing to investigate and present
the medical evidence that contradicted the State's experts'
testimony on the link between cocaine and stillbirth and failing
to challenge the State's evidence. Counsel was also ineffective in
failing to object to improper instructions that confused the
measure of intent required for homicide by child abuse. The
court initially charged the required "extreme indifference to
human life" and then gave a general charge of criminal intent.
Id. at 361. While this was proper, in response to a jury question
on intent, the court repeated only the general charge which
confused the issue further and resulted in conviction only five
minutes later. Finally, counsel was ineffective in failing to
introduce the autopsy report into evidence simply because
counsel "just forgot" when the report contradicted the State's
295
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theory of the case. Id. at 365. Prejudice was found individually
on each of these issues.
Ard v. Catoe, 642 S.E.2d 590 (S.C. 2007). Counsel found
ineffective in capital case for failing to adequately develop and
present gunshot residue evidence. The defendant was charged
with killing his pregnant girlfriend, which resulted in the viable
fetus dying from a lack of oxygen. The defense theory and the
defendant's testimony was that his girlfriend was holding a gun
during an argument and that it fired when he grabbed it to take
it away from her. The state examiner issued a report that there
was no gunshot residue on the victim's hands but testified that
"several particles a were very interesting, but there was not any
or enough material for us to be able to call gunshot residue . ..."
Id. at 592 (quoting a statement from SLED agent Joseph Powell).
Citing to the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and
Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty cases, the court held
that counsel's conduct was deficient in failing to interview the
state examiner or to cross-examine him on this point. Counsel's
conduct was also deficient because the expert they retained had
been the state expert's supervisor at the time the test was done
and he reviewed and approved the report. This expert was not
an "independent expert" because casting down on the state
examiner's findings would have implicitly cast doubt on his own
oversight of the analysis. Id. at 597. Counsel's actions "were
unreasonable and clearly deficient, especially given the fact that
this was a capital case with an arguable defense to the guilt
phase." Id. at 599. Prejudice was found because interviewing or
cross-examining the state expert and hiring an independent
expert would have revealed that, although the tests were not
conclusive for gun powder, the "interesting" particles contained
the three required elements of gunshot residue and the particles
were "consistent with gunshot residue and could have come from
her handling a weapon." Id. at 595. Prejudice was also
established because the defense's critical theory relied on this
evidence and the state capitalized in argument on the lack of
gunshot residue evidence and even called the "defense expert" to
testify that he agreed with that finding and that he had been
hired by the defense. Finally, the court noted that "the jury
apparently did not believe this to be an open-and-shut case of
[Volume 4
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murder," because the jury sought additional instructions on
involuntary manslaughter during deliberations. Id. at 598.
Nance v. Ozmint, 626 S.E.2d 878 (S.C. 2006). On remand
from the U.S. Supreme Court for consideration under Florida v.
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), the court reinstated its opinion
finding that trial counsel's failure to investigate, plan, and
present a defense in this capital trial constituted "a classic
example of a complete breakdown in the adversarial process."
Prejudice was presumed for eight reasons: (1) Lead counsel was
suffering from numerous health problems, including alcoholism,
and was taking numerous medications that impaired his memory
and caused other problems, and Co-counsel had been practicing
law for only eighteen months; (2) Counsel sought to show that
the defendant was mentally ill and wanted the jury to view him
in his unmedicated state and successfully got the judge to order
such, but then failed to inform the jail personnel of the court's
order so the jury saw "a drug-influenced demeanor" during trial;
(3) Counsel pronounced in opening statements that they were
appointed and neither of them "wanted to be there"; (4) Counsel
presented a defense of guilty but mentally ill and failed to qualify
their only expert and presented supporting testimony of the
defendant's sister only after the expert testified denying him the
opportunity to inform the jury of how the sister's testimony
supported a finding of mental illness; (5) Counsel presented no
evidence of adaptability to confinement in sentencing when they
had presented the only bad incident of urine-throwing in
confinement during the trial. Evidence was available to establish
that the defendant had been selected as an institution's inmate of
the year and nominated for the entire state's inmate of the year
and testimony was available from a jail administrator and prison
minister that the defendant was a "model inmate"; (6) Counsel
presented "no mitigating social history evidence," even though
the evidence would have established physical abuse throughout
the defendant's childhood, an alcoholic, abusive father; being
"treated with alcohol as a child in lieu of over-the-counter
medication"; and growing up "in a family of extreme poverty and
physical deprivation"; (7) "[D]efense counsel's seven-minute
mitigation presentation failed to provide the jury with any
insight concerning Petitioner's mental illness," even though he
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 297 2009-2010
has a family history of schizophrenia, history of hearing voices,
and suffered from neurological damage; (8) In closing arguments
in sentencing, counsel "failed to plead for Petitioner's life and
referred to him as a 'sick' man." Id. at 878, 882-83.
[C]ounsel abandoned his role as defense counsel and in
fact helped bolster the case against his client ....
We again recognize that this type of "consistently inept
form of lawyer conduct [is not] acceptable in this state, nor will
we employ a prejudice analysis, for '[defense] counsel's
ineffectiveness [is] so pervasive as to render a particularized
prejudice inquiry unnecessary."'
Id. at 883 (quoting Nance v. Frederick, 596 S.E.2d 62, 67
(S.C. 2004)).
Ingle v. State, 560 S.E.2d 401 (S.C. 2002). Counsel
ineffective in criminal sexual conduct and lewd acts case for
several reasons. Defendant was charged with assaulting the
daughter of his live-in girlfriend. He testified that the semen on
her shorts was a result of her sitting on the bed shortly after he
and his girlfriend had sex. Defense counsel, without
interviewing the girlfriend, called her as a defense witness. She
denied having sex with the defendant that morning. Counsel's
conduct in relying on the defendant's belief that she would admit
the intercourse and the State's failure to call her in the case in
chief was unreasonable. Defendant was prejudiced despite the
State's recall of the girlfriend in rebuttal because the prejudice of
this testimony was heightened because "it came in as part of
what was supposed to be petitioner's defense." Id. at 403.
Counsel also elicited hearsay evidence of the alleged victim's
identification of the defendant from the State's expert on child
abuse and failed to object to hearsay of the child's identification
of the defendant to a police officer. This testimony was
prejudicial because it was inadmissible corroboration and there
was other evidence that called the victim's credibility in question.
Despite the cumulativeness of the identification testimony, it was
prejudicial because it corroborated the victim's testimony.
Dove v. State, 523 S.E.2d 459 (S.C. 1999). Counsel found
ineffective in murder case for failing to obtain victim's medical
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and psychiatric records. She was found dead in a hotel room
where she had spent a few nights with her estranged husband
after they had an argument. The defendant maintained that she
had killed herself, and the defense counsel was informed that the
victim had psychiatric treatment recently. The records revealed
that she had been committed twice in the preceding three months
for substance abuse and depression and that she was suicidal.
Prejudice was found because the records could have been used to
impeach the victim's mother who denied that her daughter was
suicidal and could have created doubt where the evidence of
murder was all circumstantial and the physical evidence was just
as consistent with suicide as it was murder.
Hicks v. State, 443 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 1994). Where defendant
was charged with selling stolen goods and the evidence implied
that her boyfriend and son were in jail for the burglary of the
goods sold, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce
evidence that defendant's boyfriend and son were in jail on
charges unrelated to the burglary of the goods the defendant was
charged with selling.
Cobbs v. State, 408 S.E.2d 223 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to investigate possible defenses when
an investigation would have revealed that the prosecuting
witness (forgery charge) wanted the charges to be dropped and
the defendant had already been convicted in magistrate court for
the same burglary.
Martinez v. State, 403 S.E.2d 113 (S.C. 1991). Ineffective
trial counsel in criminal sexual conduct case for failing to
subpoena witness who would have testified that he saw the
defendant leaving a lounge three blocks from the victim's home
at 1:45 a.m. when the victim testified that she was raped at her
home and then she went to her sister's, arriving between 2:00
and 2:15 a.m.
Grier v. State, 384 S.E.2d 722 (S.C. 1989). Counsel found
ineffective in armed robbery case for failing to call alibi witnesses
who would have testified concerning an alibi and the fact that
defendant was wearing a different color of clothes than victim
alleged on the night in question. Defendant and two alibi
witnesses did testify, but there were a number of others
available.
2010] Post-Conviction Survival Skills
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 299 2009-2010
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
Frett v. State, 378 S.E.2d 249 (S.C. 1988). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to request preliminary hearing, not
knowing ahead of time when the trial was scheduled, failing to
interview or call defense witnesses, not being aware of all the
pending charges, failing to move to require the State to elect, and
sleeping during trial. Court held that, although normally a
defendant must prove actual prejudice, "such a showing may be
exempted where counsel's ineffectiveness is so pervasive as to




Padgett v. State, 484 S.E.2d 101 (S.C. 1997). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to object to first-degree burglary
indictment which alleged burglary of dwelling, but the evidence
revealed that the only building on the property was a barn in
which no one lived.
Hopkins v. State, 451 S.E.2d 389 (S.C. 1994) overruled by
State v. Gentry, 610 S.E.2d 494, 501 (S.C. 2005) ("to the extent
[the decision] combine[s] the concept of the sufficiency of an
indictment and the concept of subject matter jurisdiction"). Trial
counsel found ineffective for failing to object to amendment of
indictment which changed offenses from DUI causing great
bodily injury to DUI causing death and thereby raised maximum
punishment from ten to twenty-five years. The amendment
deprived the court of jurisdiction to accept guilty plea.
2. Motions and Notice
Morris v. State, 639 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 2006). Counsel found
ineffective in assault and battery with intent to kill trial for
failing to request a continuance, which resulted in the defendant
being tried in absentia. The defendant showed up on the
scheduled trial date, signed a sentencing sheet in anticipation of
entering a guilty plea to the lesser-included charge of assault and
battery of a high and aggravated nature, and then left the
courthouse. He could not be located when his case was called so
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he was tried in absentia. Counsel's conduct was deficient because
she objected to trial in absentia, but failed to move for a
continuance in order to enter the guilty plea agreed to with the
State. Prejudice found because the refusal of a continuance
would have amounted to an abuse of discretion where assault
and battery of high and aggravated nature, the crime the
defendant agreed to plead guilty too, is a common law
misdemeanor punishable by up to ten years in prison, while
assault and battery with intent to kill, for which he was tried and
convicted, is a violent crime felony punishable by up to twenty
years in prison.
Sikes v. State, 448 S.E.2d 560 (S.C. 1994). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to raise a meritorious Fourth
Amendment claim that defendant was improperly detained
where the only evidence of defendant's guilt was discovered as a
result of the unlawful detention.
Dupree v. State, 408 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to pursue at suppression hearing the
issue of whether police sergeant's alleged threats rendered the
defendant's statement involuntary when there is a reasonable
probability that the judge would have suppressed the statement
which contained the only evidence of guilty knowledge in the
trial for receiving stolen goods.
3. Prosecution Evidence or Argument
Holman v. State, 674 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 2009). Trial counsel
found ineffective in a case involving multiple charges arising
from a shooting incident due to counsel's failure to object to the
admission of a handgun found in defendant's apartment that had
no relevance to the offenses for which the defendant was charged.
"[T]he failure to object to this clearly inadmissible evidence was
ineffective assistance of counsel" not explained by a valid trial
strategy. Id. at 172. Prejudice established.
Miller v. State, 665 S.E.2d 596 (S.C. 2008). Counsel found
ineffective in armed robbery case for failing to cross-examine the
defendant's girlfriend, a State witness, regarding the similarities
of three armed robberies in which she and the defendant's
nephew were charged. Specifically, the girlfriend's car was used
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in each robbery, a similar handgun was used, and the victim's
description of the assailant more closely matched the nephew
than the defendant. Prejudice established because the defense
argued mistaken identity and third-party guilt, which was the
primary defense. In addition, the girlfriend's credibility was
"questionable at best," because she had initially implicated the
defendant in an armed robbery, in which she and the nephew
were charged, before she learned he could not have committed
the crime because he was in jail at the time. Id. at 600.
Roberts v. State, 602 S.E.2d 768 (S.C. 2004). Counsel
found ineffective in murder case for failing to adequately
impeach a jailhouse snitch, who testified that he was ten feet
away in the cell next to the defendant in pretrial confinement
and the defendant confessed to him. While counsel discussed
with the defendant that the conversation was impossible due to
the layout of the cells, counsel did not question the snitch about
this or present any evidence on the issue. Counsel's conduct was
deficient because, if counsel had adequately prepared and
presented the evidence, the evidence would have established that
the snitch's cell was 35 to 100 feet from the defendant and the
cell block was extremely noisy. Any conversation between the
snitch and the defendant would have been heard by numerous
guards and inmates, because the defendant would have had to
yell to be heard over the noise. Although a "close case," prejudice
was found because the snitch was a key witness, and the State's
remaining evidence consisted almost entirely of testimony of a
codefendant who had made four contradictory statements,
including implicating a clearly innocent man in three of those
statements. Id. at 771. The jury had also asked "who was on
trial" during deliberations. Id. at 772.
Vaughn v. State, 607 S.E.2d 72 (S.C. 2004). Counsel found
ineffective in drug case for failing to object to the prosecutor's
closing argument stating what uncalled witnesses would have
testified to. The State presented only the testimony of the
arresting officer to support a finding that the defendant
possessed drugs. In response to defense counsel's argument that
there had been another officer in the car at the scene who did not
testify, the prosecutor argued that the other officer would have
testified consistently if called to testify. Although the prosecutor
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW [Volume 4
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was entitled to "some response" to the defense argument, the
prosecutor's argument was unfair. Prejudice was found because
the State's evidence was limited to the arresting officer.
Moreover, during deliberations, the jury asked to see the
"testimony" of the officer who was not called to testify.
Sanchez v. State, 569 S.E.2d 363 (S.C. 2002). Counsel found
ineffective in criminal sexual conduct with a minor case for
failing to object to hearsay testimony. The six year old alleged
victim testified about the alleged assault. Her mother and father
a!so testified and included hearsay statements from the victim
concerning details of the assault and the identity of the
perpetrator. Counsel testified that he did not object to this
hearsay because it did not alter the victim's testimony and that
some of the statements where different. Counsel's conduct was
deficient because, while limited corroborative testimony is
allowed in criminal sexual conduct cases, the corroborative
evidence is limited to the time and place of the assault and
cannot include details or particulars or the identity of the
perpetrator. Thus, the mother's and father's testimony was
clearly inadmissable. Prejudice was found because improper
corroboration testimony that is cumulative to the victims
testimony cannot be harmless. "[I]t is precisely this cumulative
effect which enhances the devastating impact of improper
corroboration." Id. at 365. Counsel's conduct was also deficient in
failing to object to the testimony of a police officer concerning the
alleged victim's statement and actions with anatomically correct
dolls. Counsel's alleged strategy to allow this testimony was to
show that the victim's statements were vague. "Because the
officer's testimony regarding the dolls corroborated the victim's
testimony at trial, counsel's strategy was not reasonable given
the prejudicial effect this testimony had ... ." Id. at 366.
Matthews v. State, 565 S.E.2d 766 (S.C. 2002). Counsel
found ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor vouching for
the credibility of a State witness in her argument. Counsel
agreed remarks were improper but did not object because he did
not want judge to admonish him for objecting during argument or
give the State additional time to argue (both of which had
already happened). Counsel's reasons for failing to object were
found insufficient because "counsel cannot assert trial strategy as
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a defense for failure to object to comments which constitute an
error of law and are inherently prejudicial." Id. at 768. Prejudice
also found because this was a mass drug conspiracy trial with
numerous witnesses where the State's evidence was pretty much
all people "higher" in the conspiracy testifying for reduced
sentences.
Gilchrist v. State, 565 S.E.2d 281 (S.C. 2002). Counsel
found ineffective in attempted common law robbery case due to
counsel's failure to object to prosecutor's improper vouching for
witness's credibility in opening statements. The prosecutor
essentially gave personal assurance of the witness's veracity in
"religiously-tinged language." Id. at 285. Prejudice found
because the witness at issue was the State's key witness and his
credibility was crucial to the State's case.
Dawkins v. State, 551 S.E.2d 260 (S.C. 2001). Counsel
found ineffective in criminal sexual conduct case for failing to
object to the hearsay testimony of four witnesses that the alleged
victim told them the identity of the perpetrator. While limited
hearsay corroborative testimony is allowed in sexual assault
cases, this corroboration is limited to the time and place of the
assault and cannot include details or particulars, such as
identification of the perpetrator. The defendant was prejudiced
because improper corroboration that is merely cumulative to the
victim's testimony cannot be harmless. Moreover, where the
alleged victim's credibility was the central issue at trial, counsel's
ineffectiveness could not be excused by a strategy to avoid
upsetting or confusing the jury, especially since this issue could
have been litigated outside the presence of the jury.
McFadden v. State, 539 S.E.2d 391 (S.C. 2000). Counsel
found ineffective in drug case for failing to object to prosecutor's
argument that he only had one closing because the defense
presented no evidence,1 which was essentially a comment on
defendant's right to silence. Defendant was prejudiced by this
single reference because his exculpatory story was not totally
implausible, the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, and the
1. Under state law, the defendant was entitled to the final closing
argument only if he presented no evidence in defense. Otherwise, the state was
entitled to open and close.
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trial court's general charge on defendant's right not to testify did
not cover this situation. Counsel also ineffective for failing to
object to the prosecutor's argument that the jury could infer guilt
because the defendant left after jury selection and was tried in
absentia, and for failing to request an instruction provided by
state law that the jury could not infer guilt from the defendant's
absence.
Edmond v. State, 534 S.E.2d 682 (S.C. 2000). Counsel
found ineffective in burglary and grand larceny case for failing to
object to detective's testimony and prosecutor's comments
regarding petitioner's invocation of his rights to counsel and to
remain silent, as jurors may have used testimony and comments
to infer petitioner was guilty simply because he exercised his
rights, and circumstantial evidence of petitioner's guilt was not
overwhelming.
Green v. State, 527 S.E.2d 98 (S.C. 2000). Counsel found
ineffective in distribution of crack cocaine case for failing to
object that the probative value of two prior possession of cocaine
charges used to impeach the defendant was outweighed by the
prejudice. Defendant was arrested in an undercover sting
operation but the evidence essentially was a match of credibility
between the defendant's testimony and that of the officers.
Prejudice found because of the limited impeachment value of the
prior offenses, the remoteness of the prior convictions, the
similarity between the past crimes and the charged crime, the
importance of the defendant's testimony, and the centrality of the
credibility issue in this case.
Hudgins v. Moore, 524 S.E.2d 105 (S.C. 1999). Trial
counsel found ineffective for failing to object when the solicitor
cross-examined the defendant at the guilt or innocence phase of
trial by reading back to him his answers to true-false questions
that were part of an MMPI-A (a standardized psychological test)
administered as part of a pretrial competency evaluation at the
state hospital. The cross-examination was intended to impeach
the defendant's character for truthfulness where he initially said
he was the shooter but then testified at trial that his co-
defendant was the shooter, and he had told the police otherwise
only because the codefendant was like a brother, and he thought
if he accepted responsibility the State would be more lenient with
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him since he was only seventeen and his codefendant was
eighteen. While the court found no constitutional violation, the
court held that the State's use of test materials, derived from a
pretrial competency evaluation to assist in winning a conviction,
violated State v. Myers, 67 S.E.2d 506 (S.C. 1951), which
precludes use of information gathered during court-ordered
examination except for purposes ordered by the court. The
failure to prevent this cross-examination was prejudicial both
because of the importance of the defendant's credibility given the
facts of the case, codefendant said he was the shooter and he
testified that codefendant was the shooter, and because defense
counsel's attempt to explain away the test results led them to call
a psychiatrist who made damaging and otherwise inadmissible
statements (in the trial phase) about the defendant's antisocial
character on cross-examination.
Simmons v. State, 503 S.E.2d 164 (S.C. 1998). Counsel
found ineffective in burglary case for failing to object to improper
argument by solicitor concerning the meaning of a life sentence.
Under state law, jury in burglary case could find guilty (which
meant, at the time, a mandatory life sentence) or guilty with a
recommendation of mercy (which allowed judge to give a lesser
sentence).2 The prosecutor's argument that a life sentence "is not
the entire natural life of a person" injected the issue of parole
into the proceedings. Id. at 165. Likewise, the prosecutor's
argument equated to a recommendation of mercy with a much
lighter sentence or an acquittal. The trial court instructed the
jury that the court would sentence the defendant but gave no
instruction which cured the errors.
German v. State, 478 S.E.2d 687 (S.C. 1996). Counsel found
ineffective in possession with intent to distribute crack case for
failing to object to prosecutor's argument and police officer's
testimony that police had received several tips that the
defendant was distributing or selling crack cocaine, as this
evidence was inadmissible as a comment on defendant's
character.
Fossick v. State, 453 S.E.2d 899 (S.C. 1995). Counsel found
2. South Carolina abolished the "recommendation of mercy" verdict and
the mandatory life sentence in 1997.
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ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor's closing argument
on guilt that the defendant showed no remorse.
Mincey v. State, 444 S.E.2d 510 (S.C. 1994). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor's suggestions
during closing argument that defense witnesses testified falsely
due to intimidation by the defendant when there was no evidence
of intimidation.
Jolly v. State, 443 S.E.2d 566 (S.C. 1994). Trial counsel
found ineffective in criminal sexual conduct case for failing to
object to witness's hearsay testimony that the alleged victim told
the witness that the defendant had sexually assaulted her.
Simmons v. State, 419 S.E.2d 225 (S.C. 1992). Trial
counsel found ineffective in narcotics case for failing to object to
solicitor's cross-examination and jury argument concerning
defendant's refusal to allow warrantless search of his vehicle.
Mitchell v. State, 379 S.E.2d 123 (S.C. 1989). Trial counsel
in murder case ineffective for failing to object to inadmissible
evidence of defendant's devil worship and mafia membership
which tended to prove only that defendant was a bad person with
a propensity to commit crime.
4. Impeaching Witness
Pauling v. State, 503 S.E.2d 468 (S.C. 1998). Counsel found
ineffective in burglary and criminal sexual conduct case for
failing to call triage nurse as witness. Victim testified that she
was penetrated. Doctor testified that there was no physical
evidence of penetration, but that victim "had told her the
assailant did not enter all the way." Id. at 470. Triage nurse's
notes showed that victim told her there was no penetration.
Although triage nurse did not have any independent recollection,
the notes could have been used to refresh her recollection. The
court noted in finding prejudice: "Even defense counsel admitted
the nurse's testimony was critical." Id. at 471 (citing Martinez v.
State, 403 S.E.2d 113 (1991) (standing for the proposition that
where trial counsel admits the testimony of a certain witness
may have made the difference in obtaining an acquittal, the
Court may find ineffective assistance)).
Thomas v. State, 417 S.E.2d 531 (S.C. 1992). In rape case
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where the victim was the sole witness and she identified the
defendant as her attacker, trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to call emergency medical personnel who would have testified
that the victim stated immediately after the attack that she did
not know her assailant.
5. Eliciting Damaging Evidence and Making Damaging
Argument
Caprood v. State, 525 S.E.2d 514 (S.C. 2000). Counsel
found ineffective in armed robbery case for eliciting hearsay from
officer about the defendant's "rap sheet" and "some type of
violation." Id. at 518 (internal quotation marks omitted). Trial
court had found ineffective and granted relief on a number of
bases. Supreme Court reversed on all issues but this one because
the State had not appealed on this issue and the trial court's
ruling was thus the law of the case.
6. Instructions
Tisdale V. State, 662 S.E.2d 410 (S.C. 2008). Counsel found
ineffective in murder case for failing to request charges on
involuntary manslaughter and accident. Counsel's conduct was
deficient because the defendant's testimony supported an
involuntary manslaughter charge by providing evidence of a
struggle over a weapon and supported an accident charge
because of an accidental discharge of a gun with the defendant
lawfully armed for self-defense.
Lowry v. State, 657 S.E.2d 760 (S.C. 2008). Counsel found
ineffective in murder case for failing to object to a burden-
shifting instruction on malice. The court initially gave proper
instructions but because of the State's concern that the court had
failed to instruct on felony murder, the court gave a
supplemental instruction. While the initial charge contained
permissive language allowing the inference of malice from
participation in a felony, the supplemental charge created a
presumption of malice from participation in a felony and shifted
the burden of proof to the defendant. This charge was improper,
was not alleviated by the early proper charge, and was especially
problematic as "the last thing the jurors heard before beginning
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deliberations." Id. at 764. Counsel's conduct was deficient in
failing to object. Prejudice was also established because the error
was not "harmless [beyond a reasonable doubt]." Id. There was
"little direct probative evidence of malice" in the defendant's
statements, and other evidence was questionable or minimal
such that "the only undisputed relevant facts . . . are that
Petitioner was near the scene of the crime at the time it occurred,
but was neither the gunman, nor in the getaway car." Id. at 766.
Dawson v. State, 572 S.E.2d 445 (S.C. 2002). Counsel
found ineffective for failing to object to a coercive Allen charge.
During deliberations the jury foreman informed the court that
the jury was split 11 to I and that he did not know whether the
jury could reach a unanimous verdict. The court asked the
foreman to consult with the other jurors to see if a consensus
could be reached and then asked the foreman if the numerical
split was the same. The court then gave an Allen charge, which
could be perceived as being directed toward the minority juror.
The charge was coercive, especially in light of the judge's
knowledge that there was only one holdout juror. The court also
erred in not instructing the jury not to state its numerical
division and also inquiring as to the jury's continued numerical
division.
Tate v. State, 570 S.E.2d 522 (S.C. 2002). Counsel found
ineffective in murder and assault case for failing to object to jury
instructions that unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to
the defendant by stating that malice was presumed from the use
of a deadly weapon. Counsel's conduct was deficient in failing to
object to the presumption of malice charge where counsel's sole
objection was that the charges were given undue emphasis
because the charge was first given as a supplemental charge at
the solicitor's request after the jury had been sent out. The
charge was given twice more in response to jury questions during
deliberations without additional objection from counsel other
than the undue emphasis. The court found no prejudice with
respect to the murder conviction because malice was clear on
that charge and the erroneous instructions would not have
contributed to the jury's findings. Prejudice, however, was found
with respect to the assault and battery with intent to kill
conviction because though there was a reasonable probability
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that the erroneous charges affected the jury's consideration in
deciding guilt on this charge or the lesser included charge of
assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, which did
not require a finding of malice. Prejudice found because the
evidence of malice on this charge was not overwhelming. Finally,
the trial court's proper instruction in conclusion of an inference of
malice that was not binding on the jury did not cure the
prejudice. This instruction was not given immediately following
the malice charges and "was given only once, whereas the
erroneous presumption of malice charge was repeated three
times." Id. at 528.
Pauling v. State, 565 S.E.2d 769 (S.C. 2002). Counsel found
ineffective in case involving two murder charges and numerous
other charges. The defense contested only the murder charges.
After the jury indicated that it was hung only on the murder
charges and inquired whether failure to agree would require a
complete new trial or only a new trial on the murder charges, the
court, without objection, instructed the jury that failure to agree
would require a new trial on all issues. Counsel found ineffective
for failing to object because the court's instruction was wrong.
Failure to reach agreement on the murder charges would not
result in mistrial on charges where the jury did reach a verdict.
Where State's theory was accomplice liability, prejudice found
because jury, following the erroneous instruction, convicted
defendant on one murder charge and acquitted on the other
charge even though there was no evidence in the record
distinguishing the two defendants' conduct such to convict one
and not the other.
Brightman v. State, 520 S.E.2d 614 (S.C. 1999). Counsel
found ineffective for failing to request a specific charge required
by state law (but no longer after this opinion) that informs the
jury that any reasonable doubt between lesser and greater
offenses must be resolved in the defendant's favor.
Brunson v. State, 477 S.E.2d 711 (S.C. 1996). Counsel
found ineffective in possession with intent to distribute crack
case for failing to request a mere presence charge when the
evidence revealed that the drugs seized were not found on either
of the two co-defendants who were tried jointly.
Roseboro v. State, 454 S.E.2d 312 (S.C. 1995). Counsel
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found ineffective for failing to request alibi charge in criminal
sexual conduct case when State's case was circumstantial, alibi
witnesses testified, and prosecutor disparaged alibi during
closing argument. Strategic decision was unreasonable.
Chalk v. State, 437 S.E.2d 19 (S.C. 1994), overruled by
Brightman v. State, 520 S.E.2d 614, 616 n.5 (S.C. 1999). Trial
counsel found ineffective for failing to request an instruction to
resolve any reasonable doubt as to whether defendant was guilty
of murder or manslaughter in favor of the lesser included offense.
Taylor v. State, 439 S.E.2d 820 (S.C. 1993). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to object to burden shifting
instruction on issue of intent to distribute controlled substances.
Riddle v. State, 418 S.E.2d 308 (S.C. 1992). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to request an alibi instruction when
the sole theory of defense was alibi.
Gallman v. State, 414 S.E.2d 780 (S.C. 1992). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to object to judge's comment prior to
closing arguments and instructions that jurors were free to talk
about the case among themselves.
Battle v. State, 409 S.E.2d 400 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to request specific instructions on
appearances to defendant and retreat as it related to self-
defense.
Carter v. State, 392 S.E.2d 184 (S.C. 1990), overruled in
part by Brightman v. State, 520 S.E.2d 614, 616 n.5 (S.C. 1999).
Trial counsel found ineffective in murder/manslaughter case for
failing to object to instruction which created a mandatory
presumption of malice (rather than allowing a permissive
inference) and precluded a finding of manslaughter. Trial
counsel also found ineffective for failing to request the required
instruction that the jury had a duty to resolve doubt as to level of
guilt in defendant's favor and find him guilty only of the lesser
offense.
Dandy v. State, 391 S.E.2d 581 (S.C. 1990). Counsel found
ineffective for failing to object to a self-defense charge which
erroneously stated that defendant must prove self-defense by a
preponderance of the evidence.
High v. State, 386 S.E.2d 463 (S.C. 1989). Counsel found
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ineffective for failing to object when the judge, during a
manslaughter charge, instructed that the law presumes intent
from the doing of an unlawful act.
Stone v. State, 363 S.E.2d 903 (S.C. 1988). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to request a self-defense instruction
when the facts of the case clearly supported such an instruction.
Sosebee v. Leeke, 362 S.E.2d 22 (S.C. 1987). Trial counsel
in criminal sexual conduct case found ineffective for failing to
object to judge's improper comments in the presence of the jury
which clearly reflected that the judge believed the victim's
testimony.
7. Failure to Challenge Competence
Matthews v. State, 596 S.E.2d 49 (S.C. 2004). Counsel
found ineffective in an armed robbery, car jacking, and accessory
after the fact to murder plea for failing to request a competence
hearing prior to the defendant's plea. The defendant had
learning disabilities and took special education classes in school.
Just one year before the crimes, the defendant had been in a near
fatal car accident that caused significant neurological damage to
his frontal lobe.
8. Miscellaneous
Wertz v. State, 562 S.E.2d 654 (2002). Counsel found
ineffective in a second degree burglary case for failing to request
clarification of the jury's verdict with respect to the degree of the
burglary conviction where the jury acquitted the defendant of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent offense
but convicted him on second degree burglary, which required a
finding that the defendant was armed. Prejudice was found
because the jury was not instructed to specify the degree of
burglary found or that a general verdict had the effect of finding
petitioner guilty of the offense charged in the indictment.
Patrick v. State, 562 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2002). Counsel found
ineffective in burglary case for failing to request mercy from jury.
Under state law at the time, a jury in a burglary case could find
guilty (which meant, at the time, a mandatory life sentence) or
guilty with a recommendation of mercy (which allowed a judge to
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give a lesser sentence of as little as five years).3 The court held
"failure to argue mercy is per se prejudicial." Id. at 613.
Banshee v. State, 418 S.E.2d 313 (S.C. 1992) (per curiam).
Trial counsel found ineffective for successfully moving for
dismissal of a nonviolent charge of receiving stolen goods thereby
leaving the jury with the extreme alternatives of convicting the
defendant of violent offenses (armed robbery, kidnapping,
conspiracy, and possession of a sawed-off shotgun) or acquitting
him.
II. CAPITAL SENTENCING PHASE ERRORS
A. Numerous Deficiencies and Inadequate Mitigation
Rosemond v. Catoe, 680 S.E.2d 5 (S.C. 2009). Counsel
found ineffective in capital sentencing for failing to present
evidence of the defendant's mental illness. There was no need to
"speculate about the mitigation evidence known by trial counsel
as the evidence was presented during pretrial competency
hearings." Id. at 9. Specifically, two defense experts testified
that the defendant was "clearly paranoid" and suffered either
from a delusional disorder or schizophrenia but a diagnosis could
not be made because the defendant was evasive and guarded
even with the experts. Id. A court-appointed examiner was also
willing to testify that the defendant might be in the early stages
of schizophrenia. Trial counsel did not present this evidence in
sentencing because he "mistakenly believed" that the trial court's
finding of competence to stand trial "precluded him from
presenting . . . mental health mitigation evidence in the
sentencing phase. Counsel's erroneous belief clearly constituted
deficient representation." Id. at 8-9. Prejudice was also
established because counsel only presented a few family
members and friends to portray the defendant as a good boy, and
a mental health expert gave "conclusory" testimony that the
defendant "could adjust to prison." Id. at 10. The expert
conceded on cross, however, that he had not diagnosed a mental
3. South Carolina abolished the "recommendation of mercy" verdict and
the mandatory life sentence in 1997.
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illness. In short, "the theme of the evidence was the absence of
any mental health concerns." Id. Even with only this evidence,
the jury deliberated for more than eleven hours over two days
and received an Allen charge before reaching its death verdict.
"Given the jury's struggle during the sentencing phase and the
want of any mental health mitigation evidence," prejudice was
found. Id.
Council v. State, 670 S.E.2d 356 (S.C. 2008). Counsel found
ineffective in capital sentencing for failing to adequately
investigate and present mitigation. Defense counsel asserted
during trial and sentencing that the defendant was "merely
present at the time" of the crimes, which were committed by
another man. Id. at 358. The only mitigation evidence presented
was "extremely limited testimony" of the defendant's mother. Id.
at 364. Counsel's conduct was deficient, as follows:
Initially, trial counsel was deficient in not beginning his
investigation into [the defendant's] background once the State
served its notice of intent to seek the death penalty, counsel
discovered that [the defendant's] DNA was found at the scene
of the crime, and counsel learned of Respondent's inculpatory
statements to police indicating that he sexually assaulted the
victim. Clearly counsel should have been aware that the
defense accomplice theory was not that strong and that
mitigation evidence was the only means of influencing the jury
to recommend a life sentence.
Id. at 363. Nonetheless, counsel sought only limited records
prior to trial, did not request other records until the day jury
selection began, did not have the defendant examined by a
defense psychiatrist "until one month before trial," and provided
the defense psychiatrist "with only limited records." Id. "As in
Wiggins, counsel[']s conduct fell below the standards set by the
ABA." Id. (citing American Bar Association 11.4.1(2)(C) (1989)
(Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases)). "Even the limited information obtained
should have put counsel on notice that [the defendant's]
background, with additional investigation, could potentially yield
powerful mitigating evidence. Id. (internal citations omitted).
"[N]ot only did counsel delay in investigating [the defendant's]
background, he failed to conduct an adequate investigation.
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Significantly, [counsel] failed to provide his only expert witness
. .with sufficient records and only directed him to evaluate .
competency to stand trial and criminal responsibility." Id. The
expert, "at the direction of counsel" also "only met with [the
defendant] on two occasions, the first being shortly before trial."
Id.
Furthermore, even though the funding was available, trial
counsel chose not to hire a social history investigator. Instead,
he relied on his law partner and private investigator to collect
potentially relevant information. However, neither of these
individuals was qualified in terms of social work experience, to
evaluate the information to assess [the defendant's]
background.
Finally, we believe it was unreasonable for trial counsel
not to obtain . . .family records. First, it is inexplicable that
trial counsel deemed these records unimportant because they
did not directly involve [the defendant]. . . . secondly, even
counsel[']s brief interviews with . . .family members and the
DJJ records should have alerted him to the fact that the family
was dysfunctional, [the defendant] had been raised in a violent
home environment, and experienced learning disabilities. All
of these factors constituted mitigating evidence and warranted
further investigation.
Id. at 363-64 (internal citations omitted). "Even if trial
counsel[']s investigation could be deemed sufficient or adequate,
we believe trial counsel also failed to present any significant
mitigating evidence." Id. at 364. Counsel's conduct was not
excused by strategy because:
[S]trategic choices made by counsel after an incomplete
investigation are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable
professional judgment supports the limitations on the
investigation. Secondly, counsel was already aware the jury
had rejected the defense theory that [the defendant] was not
the actual perpetrator but was merely present .... Thirdly, it
would not have been inconsistent for trial counsel . . . to
present the accomplice theory during the guilt phase but
mitigation evidence in the penalty phase .... Finally, given the
State had already presented damaging character evidence, we
do not believe [the defendant's] character could have been
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damaged any further by the presentation of additional
mitigating evidence. Trial counsel essentially would have had
"nothing to lose" and "everything to gain" by presenting this
evidence.
Id. at 364-65. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Prejudice found despite "overwhelming" evidence of guilt and the
jury's finding of six aggravating factors because the jury did not
hear "very strong mitigating evidence," including: (1) "medical
evidence or other testimony describing mental health issues or
that several of his immediate family members suffered from
mental illness," such as "schizophrenia, schizoid, bipolar
disorder, depression, and borderline personality disorder"; (2)
alcoholic father and parents' divorce on the basis of physical
cruelty; (3) "bad neighborhoods" and extreme poverty; (4) a
significant drop in I.Q. between the ages of seven and ten "which
may have been the result of a head injury or the onset of mental
illness"; (5) "began getting into trouble at the age of ten years
most likely as the result of his violent family environment and
negative influence of his siblings"; (6) alcohol and drug use
beginning at age sixteen; (7) attempted suicide in his twenties;
(8) "a borderline I.Q. and frontal lobe brain dysfunction"; and (9)
"the onset of ... schizophrenia [which is undisputed now and has
rendered the defendant incompetent since at least 2001] may
have begun in early adolescence or childhood." Id. at 365. The
court concluded: "We cannot say [beyond a reasonable doubt] that
the undiscovered mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, would
not have influenced at least one juror to recommend a life
sentence for [the defendant]." Id. at 366 n.7.
Von Dohlen v. State, 602 S.E.2d 738 (S.C. 2004). Counsel
found ineffective in capital sentencing for failing to adequately
prepare and present mitigation. Counsel presented evidence that
the petitioner was a good husband, a good father, and a
dependable employee. He grew up in a poor family and had
suffered physical and emotional abuse as a child. He had no
prior criminal record. His brother was murdered just two weeks
before the crimes and petitioner became withdrawn and
depressed and began abusing alcohol and Valium. The "violent
murder was completely unexpected and out of character for a
man who had never displayed violent tendencies." Id. at 741.
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During sentencing, counsel presented testimony from a defense
psychiatrist that petitioner suffered an "adjustment reaction
with mixed features of emotions and conduct," and pathological
intoxication of alcohol and Valium abuse. Id. The psychiatrist
testified, however, that petitioner "did not have a chronic mental
illness" and the prosecutor capitalized on this in closing
arguments. Id. Counsel's conduct was deficient in failing to
provide the defense expert with available medical records and
testing relating both to the petitioner, as well as his father and
brother. Prejudice found because, with the available records, the
defense expert would have testified that the petitioner "suffered
from severe, chronic depression, a major mental illness," with
"psychotic and suicidal tendencies." Id. at 742. Counsel's conduct
was also deficient in failing to object to the prosecutor's closing
argument in sentencing inviting the jurors to put themselves in
the "victim's shoes," which was improper under state law and
impermissible under Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Id.
at 743-44. Prejudice was not, however, established on this issue.
B. One Deficiency
1. State Aggravation Evidence or Argument
Hall v. Catoe, 601 S.E.2d 335 (S.C. 2004). Counsel found
ineffective in capital sentencing for failing to object to the
prosecutor's closing argument that asked the jury to compare the
defendant's worth and the victims' worth in an emotionally
inflammatory fashion unrelated to the circumstances of the crime
and traditional victim impact evidence.
III. NON-CAPITAL SENTENCING ERRORS
Davis v. State, 520 S.E.2d 801 (S.C. 1999). Counsel found
ineffective for failing to object to the trial court's consideration of
the defendant's exercise of the right to trial in sentencing the
defendant to ten years for distribution of crack. Following the
sentencing, counsel moved to reconsider on the basis that several
similarly situated defendants got lesser sentences. The court
said that the other sentences were lower because the other
defendants pled guilty. Because it is an abuse of discretion for
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the trial court to consider the defendant's exercise of his right to
trial as an aggravating factor, counsel was ineffective for failing
to object.
Scott v. State, 513 S.E.2d 100 (S.C. 1999). Counsel found
ineffective in this drug trafficking case for failing to object to the
court considering a 1987 misdemeanor conviction for simple
possession and sentencing the defendant as a second offender
under the statute. The 1987 charge was actually a bond
forfeiture for failure to appear and not a "conviction" for purposes
of sentencing under the drug statute. A bond forfeiture may be
considered a "conviction" only when the legislature specifically
provides that the two are equivalent. Because the legislature
had done so in other contexts, the court inferred the legislature
did not intend for a bond forfeiture to be the equivalent of a
conviction in this context. The defendant was prejudiced because
the maximum sentence for a first offense is ten years and for a
second offense thirty years. The defendant was sentenced to
thirty years.
Chubb v. State, 401 S.E.2d 159 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
found ineffective in burglary case, where a burglary conviction
mandated a life sentence unless the jury recommended mercy, for
failing to present mitigation evidence or argue for mercy during
the guilt phase because of her erroneous expectation that a
separate sentencing proceeding would be held.
Watson v. State, 338 S.E.2d 636 (S.C. 1985). Trial counsel
found ineffective in burglary case, where a burglary conviction
mandated a life sentence unless the jury recommended mercy, for
failing to advise defendant who pled guilty that he had the right
to have a jury impaneled following the guilty plea to consider a
recommendation a mercy.
IV. ADVISING CLIENT
A. Guilty Plea After Inadequate Investigation or Research
Berry v. State, 675 S.E.2d 425 (S.C. 2009). Counsel found
ineffective in drug case in failing to inform the defendant, who
pled guilty to a drug charge, of a potential challenge to the use of
his prior conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia for
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sentencing enhancement purposes. Counsel's conduct was
deficient because "a conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia may not be used for enhancement purposes as it
does not 'relate to' drugs as statutorily mandated." Id. at 426-27.
Nonetheless, counsel did not challenge the State's reliance on the
paraphernalia conviction for enhancement purposes or inform
the defendant of the potential challenge. Indeed "counsel never
gave any thought to the issue." Id. at 427. While the validity of
the legal challenge may have been "unclear" at the time of the
plea, "uncertainty concerning a potential legal challenge may
well provide a defendant a catalyst in plea negotiations with the
State." Id. Counsel's conduct was deficient because "[s]imply
saying 'I never gave it a thought' falls short of the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel." Id.
Prejudice was established because the defendant testified in PCR
that he would have gone to trial if he had known that his
paraphernalia conviction did not qualify as a prior offense for
enhancement purposes.
Stevens v. State, 617 S.E.2d 366 (S.C. 2005). Counsel found
ineffective in plea to receiving stolen goods case where the
defendant was charged and pled to eighteen counts. If counsel
had adequately investigated and researched the issue, counsel
could have challenged the number of indictments because, under
the "plain meaning of the statute," the receipt of multiple items
in a single transaction or event constitutes a single offence. Id. at
368. Prejudice found because the defendant likely would not
have pled guilty to eighteen counts and may well have received a
lighter sentence if the court had four or five counts before it
rather than eighteen.
B. Erroneous Advice on Sentencing or Collateral Consequences
That Leads to Plea
Turner v. State, 517 S.E.2d 442 (S.C. 1999). Counsel found
ineffective for failing to adequately advise defendant prior to
plea. Defendant entered plea to pending charges after his
probation was revoked and he was sentenced to serve the
remaining fourteen years on prior charges. He actually only had
seven years remaining on the prior charge however and would
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not have pled guilty for the fifteen year concurrent sentence if he
had known that.
Alexander v. State, 402 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1991). Trial
counsel found ineffective for advising client that he would face
potential life sentence if he proceeded to trial when he would
have actually faced a seven to twenty-five year sentence for one
charge and a twenty-five year sentence for the second charge.
Based on trial counsel's erroneous advice, defendant pled guilty.
Ray v. State, 401 S.E.2d 151 (S.C. 1991). Counsel found
ineffective for advising defendant he would get life without
parole if convicted which prompted guilty pleas when sentence
actually ranged from seventy-five years without parole to as little
as ten years if sentences ran concurrently.
Hinson v. State, 377 S.E.2d 338 (S.C. 1989). Trial counsel
in murder case found ineffective for advising client that he would
be eligible for parole in ten years if he pled guilty when in fact he
would not be eligible for parole until twenty years had passed.
Defendant pled guilty based on this erroneous advice.
C. Failure to Inform Defendant or State of Plea Offer
Davie v. State, 675 S.E.2d 416 (S.C. 2009). Counsel found
ineffective in drug trafficking case for failing to inform the
defendant of the State's initial written plea offer in which the
State offered a fifteen-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.
Counsel was unaware of the State's offer until after its expiration
because counsel was relocating his office and changing his
mailing address. Ultimately, the defendant entered a "straight
up" plea to eight charges in return for the State dismissing three
charges, and the State recommended life without parole. Id. at
419. The defendant was sentenced to twenty-seven years. Even
though counsel may not have been aware of the plea offer until
after the expiration date, counsel's conduct was deficient in
failing to object at the plea hearing to lack of notice of the first
offer when it was mentioned by the State. "Had counsel done so,
he might have been able to convince the solicitor to reinstate this
plea offer or persuade the circuit court judge to impose a fifteen-
year sentence." Id. at 421. Prejudice established based on the
difference in the sentence the defendant received and that offered
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by the State initially and the fact that counsel and the defendant
testified that he would have accepted the initial plea offer if it
had been communicated to him. Remanded for resentencing not
to exceed the original twenty-seven year sentence.
D. Other Erroneous Legal Advice Leading to Plea
Jackson v. State, 535 S.E.2d 926 (S.C. 2000). Counsel
found ineffective in threatening a public official case for failing to
advise the defendant that the crime was a felony. During plea
hearing counsel said it was a misdemeanor. Prejudice found
because defendant testified he would not have pled nolo
contendere if he had known it was a felony. Trial judge found
this testimony was not credible, but appellate court reversed
because regardless of credibility there was no contrary evidence
supporting the court's finding that petitioner would have pled
guilty anyway.
Murdock v. State, 426 S.E.2d 740 (S.C. 1992). Trial counsel
was ineffective for advising defendant to plead guilty to
possession of counterfeit substance with intent to distribute
when the defendant was actually in possession of an imitation,
not counterfeit, substance and possession of an imitation
substance with intent to distribute is not a crime.
Shirley v. State, 411 S.E.2d 215 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to advise defendant, prior to his entry
of guilty plea, that his incriminating statements made which
were induced by the investigating officer's promise of a four-year
sentence cap may have been made involuntarily and, if so, would
be inadmissible at trial.
Kerrigan v. State, 406 S.E.2d 160 (S.C. 1991). Trial
counsel found ineffective for failing to advise defendant, who
continuously declared his intent to return the car, that if he went
to trial on grand larceny of automobile charge, he could have
requested an instruction on the lesser offense of use of vehicle
without permission and might have been convicted of the lesser
offense. Without this advice, the defendant pled guilty to the
grand larceny charge.
Jivers v. State, 406 S.E.2d 154 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
found ineffective for advising defendant that the Double
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Jeopardy Clause would not bar prosecution on charge of assault
and battery which was based on the same conduct which
supported a previous conviction for criminal domestic violence.
Defendant pled guilty based on this erroneous advice.
Davenport v. State, 389 S.E.2d 649 (S.C. 1990). Counsel
found ineffective for "advising [defendant] to plead 'guilty but
mentally ill' to murder" despite knowledge that the State's
psychiatrist diagnosed defendant as insane at time of offense and
counsel failed to discuss insanity with defendant. Id. at 649-50.
E. Inadequate Advice on Right to Testify or to Make Closing
Argument
Cooper v. Moore, 569 S.E.2d 330 (S.C. 2002). Counsel found
ineffective in murder capital case for failing to advise defendant
that he had a statutory right to personally address the jury
regarding all charges in trial closing argument. Defendant was
convicted of murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, and conspiracy
to commit armed robbery and was sentenced to death. On direct
appeal the court, applying in favorem vitae review, found that
reversal of the murder conviction was required because the trial
court failed to advise the defendant of his right to make a closing
argument. Because in favorem vitae review (which required a
review of the record for error regardless of counsel's failure to
object) applied only to murder charges, the court did not address
whether the non-capital convictions should also be reversed. In
post-conviction relief proceedings, defendant asserted that
counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him of his statuary
right to make a closing argument on all charges. The court held
that S.C. Code section 16-3-28 provides that "in any criminal
trial where the maximum penalty is death or in a separate
sentencing proceeding following such trial, the defendant and his
counsel shall have the right to make the last argument." Id. at
332 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-28 (1985 & Supp. 2001)). The
court held that the plain language of this statute allows the
capital defendant to address the jury regarding all charges
whether or not all of the charges carry the death penalty.
Counsel's conduct was deficient in failing to advise the defendant
of his statutory right to make a closing argument during the
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trial. Prejudice was found because the defendant had not
testified during trial in order to avoid cross-examination with
prior conviction. Thus, the jury did not have the opportunity to
hear him argue for his innocence or to hear and consider his side
of the story. Prejudice found because the evidence against the
defendant was mostly circumstantial and not overwhelming.
Thus, the defendant's statement could have swayed the jury to
find him not guilty on the non-capital charges.
Horton v. State, 411 S.E.2d 223 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
found ineffective for advising defendant that, if he testified, he
could be cross-examined about prior convictions for simple
possession of marijuana (not a crime of moral turpitude) and
assault and battery with intent to kill (fifteen years previously
and defense counsel failed to get a rule from judge concerning
remoteness). Defendant did not testify because of this advice.
F. Inadequate Advice on Right to Appeal
Johnson v. State, 480 S.E.2d 733 (S.C. 1997). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to timely notify defendant of right to
appeal so direct appeal issues were reviewed on the merits in
PCR appeal.
V. FAILURE TO COMPEL COMPLIANCE WITH PLEA
AGREEMENT
Custodio v. State, 644 S.E.2d 36 (S.C. 2007). Counsel
found ineffective in burglary and grand larceny case for failing to
have the defendant's plea agreement enforced based on
detrimental reliance. Shortly after his arrest, the defendant met
with police and two assistant prosecutors and was promised a
fifteen-year cap if he would cooperate with officers. He did so in
admitting to "a string of at least seventy-five burglaries" and
assisting in the recovery of a half million dollars worth of
property. Id. at 37. Following his cooperation, the elected
prosecutor chose not to honor the initial agreement, and the
defendant pled guilty and was sentenced to forty-five years.
Counsel's conduct was deficient in failing to pursue enforcement
of the initial agreement, which the defendant told her about, and
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the police and the assistant prosecutors confirmed. The lower
court's finding that there was no agreement was "without any
evidence of probative value" because the defendant and his
counsel testified and the State presented no contrary evidence.
Id. at 38. Thus, "[t]he only evidence presented was that an
agreement in fact existed." Id. Prejudice established because the
defendant was entitled to enforcement of the deal. The State
may withdraw a plea bargain offer before a defendant pleads
guilty, provided the defendant has not detrimentally relied on
the offer. Id. at 39. Here, the defendant had detrimentally relied
on the offer. Initial plea bargain enforced.
Thompson v. State, 531 S.E.2d 294 (S.C. 2000). Counsel
found ineffective following plea to voluntary manslaughter for
failing to object to the State's request for the maximum sentence
of thirty years in violation of the negotiated plea agreement.
State had agreed to make no sentencing recommendation. Court
had stated during plea negotiations that it would give a sentence
of no less than twenty years but would not give the maximum
sentence. State recommended maximum. Defense failed to
object and even stated prosecutor had complied with the
agreement. Court gave a sentence of twenty-five years. The
supreme court held defendant was prejudiced even though the
defendant was sentenced within the range previously stated by
the court because the relevant question for prejudice was
whether the defendant would have entered the plea knowing that
the prosecutor would recommend the maximum punishment.
Court found a reasonable probability that the defendant would
not have pled guilty based on the defendant's indecision to plead
until just prior to trial and reliance on the agreement. The court
remanded but only for resentencing.
Jordan v. State, 374 S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1988). Trial counsel
found ineffective for failing to move to withdraw the guilty plea
entered only because the prosecution promised not to oppose
probation when in fact the prosecution reneged and vigorously
opposed probation.
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VI. PERFECTING APPEAL
Frasier v. State, 410 S.E.2d 572 (S.C. 1991). Trial counsel
ineffective for failing to perfect the direct appeal after defendant
informed him that he desired to appeal but could not afford cost
of transcript. Counsel merely advised defendant to try to qualify
for indigent status and took no further steps.
VII. APPEAL
Patrick v. State, 562 S.E.2d 609 (S.C. 2002). Appellate
counsel ineffective in burglary, armed robbery, assault and
battery with intent to kill, and unauthorized use of motor vehicle
case for failing to adequately assert a claim of prosecutorial
retaliation. Applicant was initially indicted in 1975. All of the
charges except burglary were nol prossed prior to trial, and
applicant was tried and convicted of burglary. Following reversal
in 1992 in post-conviction proceedings, the State reindicted,
tried, and convicted on all charges. Trial counsel adequately
preserved the issue of vindictive prosecution. The same counsel
on appeal, however, "devoted three short paragraphs to this
issue, not give any useful analysis, and only cited one case." Id.
at 611. The appellate court did not address this issue and
instead simply held that the nol prossed charges could be brought
since they were nol prossed before the jury was impaneled.
Counsel did not address the retaliation argument in his petition
for rehearing, and then when directed by the court to address the
issue in a supplemental petition for rehearing, "counsel's
argument was conclusory at best. He did not even mention the
seminal case" that he had cited earlier in his brief. Id. at 611-12.
Prejudice was found because this issue was a winner on appeal
when analyzed under supreme court precedent (oddly enough,
the one case that was cited by appellate counsel).
Ezell v. State, 548 S.E.2d 852 (S.C. 2001). Appellate counsel
provided ineffective assistance for failing to adequately complete
record in order to challenge admission of hearsay taped
statements wherein non-testifying confidential informant
identified applicant as the person who sold crack cocaine to the
informant. Appellate counsel, who was also the trial counsel,
2010]
HeinOnline -- 4 Charleston L. Rev. 325 2009-2010
CHARLESTON LAW REVIEW
preserved the issue at trial and raised it on appeal, but failed to
include the audio tape in the Record on Appeal. The post-
conviction court found ineffective assistance and granted a new
direct appeal. The supreme court found, however, that if the
appellate court had been provided with the tapes during the
appeal, the court would have granted a new trial because the
evidence of guilt was not overwhelming and admission of the
tapes was not harmless error. Thus, the appropriate remedy for
the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was a new trial.
Southerland v. State, 524 S.E.2d 833 (S.C. 1999).
Appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel that
required a new sentencing trial. Trial counsel requested an
instruction on life without parole, but the trial court refused.
Trial counsel then requested a charge that life is to be
understood in its "ordinary and plain meaning," pursuant to
State v. Norris, 328 S.E.2d 339 (S.C. 1985) (requiring instruction
when the issue of parole was raised), and the trial court also
denied that request. Id. at 835. Appellate counsel raised only the
life without parole issue, but the court affirmed because the State
had not argued future dangerousness and this instruction was
not required under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154
(1994). If appellate counsel had asserted the Norris claim,
reversal would have been required because the portion of the
subsequent opinion in State v. Atkins, 360 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1987),
requiring that the court give the charge upon request by the
defense was applicable. Prejudice found because failure to give
the ordinary and plain meaning charge upon request requires
automatic reversal under state law.
Simpkins v. State, 401 S.E.2d 142 (S.C. 1991). Appellate
counsel found ineffective for failing to raise an obvious reversible
error on direct appeal, i.e., the guardian ad litem of the child
criminal sexual assault victim was the only person to testify
regarding the identity of the perpetrator and the details of the
incident.
VIII. PROBATION REVOCATION
Nichols v. State, 417 S.E.2d 860 (S.C. 1992). Counsel found
ineffective at proceeding to revoke probation for failing to make
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restitutionary payments because counsel did not object to State's
failure to present evidence that the unemployed defendant had
not made a bona fide effort to pay.
IX. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Lomax v. State, 665 S.E.2d 164 (S.C. 2008). Counsel in
drug case plea had an actual conflict of interest due to counsel's
simultaneous representation and plea of the petitioner's husband
on related offenses arising from the same facts. In essence, the
petitioner was initially arrested for distribution to an undercover
officer and had three subsequent similar distributions. Her
husband's charges arose from removing the drugs and money
from their home after her initial arrest and prior to execution of a
search warrant for their home. Nonetheless, counsel spent more
time preparing the husband's case, even though the petitioner
was charged with the majority of the offenses and faced a more
severe sentence. Counsel also advised the husband of the
conflict, but could not recall whether she advised petitioner.
Counsel also argued for leniency, specifically arguing his limited
involvement as compared to the petitioner, and then argued
reconsideration of sentencing for the husband, but did not argue
for leniency or reconsideration for the defendant. The husband
was sentenced to three years, while the petitioner was given
concurrent sentences ranging between five and twenty-five years.
Counsel's actual conflict was also clear in that the petitioner
pleaded guilty to the majority of the drug charges while the
husband plead guilty to a single count because counsel was able
to convince the prosecutor to dismiss additional charges for him,
which "essentially pitted [h]usband against [p]etitioner, which
was clearly detrimental to [p]etitioner's interests." Id. at 168.
Staggs v. State, 643 S.E.2d 690 (S.C. 2007). Counsel in
murder case had an actual conflict that adversely affected his
performance at trial where counsel also simultaneously
represented the defendant's father, mother, and brother who
were charged as accessories after the fact. The defendant did not
testify at trial based on trial counsel's advice to him that he
wanted to preserve the right to the final closing argument.
Counsel had told the defendant's father and sister-in-law,
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however, that he would not allow the defendant to testify and
they should encourage him not to because his testimony could
harm his family members' cases.
State v. Gregory, 612 S.E.2d 449 (S.C. 2005). The trial
court erred in denying counsel's motion to withdraw and to allow
the defendant a continuance in a lewd acts case. After counsel
began representation of the defendant, counsel began
representing the prosecutor in his case in her own divorce action.
After counsel began negotiating for the defendant, the defendant
was indicted on an additional charge. Counsel moved to
withdraw on the morning of trial because the defendant's
confidence in his abilities was diminished. The court denied the
motion and ordered only that a different prosecutor would try the
case. The trial court erred because there was an actual conflict of
interest due to counsel's divided loyalties. Prejudice presumed.
Thomas v. State, 551 S.E.2d 254 (S.C. 2001). Counsel in
drug case had an actual conflict where counsel represented
husband and wife charged with drug trafficking. Counsel
initially informed the defendant about dangers of joint
representation and received a waiver. Later, however, the
prosecutor offered a deal to allow both to plead to lesser offenses
for an eight-year sentence, or to allow one to plead guilty to all
and receive the maximum sentence while the other had charges
dismissed. The wife pled guilty and received the maximum
sentence, and charges against her husband were dismissed.
Counsel acted on his divided loyalty by failing to advise the
defendant, whom he believed to be the less culpable of the two,
that she had nothing to lose by proceeding to trial since she was
receiving the maximum punishment in the plea agreement.
Although petitioner initially waived a conflict of interest,
once it became clear an actual conflict existed due to the plea
bargain, counsel should have either withdrawn from
representing one or both of them or acquired another waiver
covering this specific conflict. To be valid, a waiver of a conflict
of interest must not only be voluntary, it must be done
knowingly and intelligently.
Id. at 256.
Edgemon v. State, 455 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. 1995). Counsel in
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burglary case had an actual conflict that adversely affected
representation where counsel represented defendant and two co-
defendants. Initially, the State was negotiating with both co-
defendants to plead guilty and testify against the defendant.
One of the co-defendants entered an agreement to testify against
defendant in exchange for Pretrial Intervention (ultimate
dismissal of charges possible). Defendant ultimately pled guilty.
Counsel testified in post-conviction that he did not negotiate the
codefendants' deals but did emphasize to the prosecutor that the
codefendants were less culpable than the defendant. Counsel
should have withdrawn from the joint representation.
Carter v. State, 362 S.E.2d 20 (S.C. 1987). Trial counsel
should not be appointed in post-conviction proceedings unless the
applicant was specifically advised of the hazards of being
represented by trial counsel and waived the issue.
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